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Beginning in 1985, Judge and then Justice Antonin Scalia 
advocated forcefully against the use of legislative history in 
statutory interpretation.  Justice Scalia’s position, in line with 
his textualism, was that legislative history was irrelevant and 
judges should avoid invoking it.  Reactions to his attacks 
among Justices and prominent circuit judges had an ideologi-
cal quality, with greater support from ideological conserva-
tives.  In this Article, we consider the role that political party 
and timing of judicial nomination played in circuit judges’ use 
of legislative history.  Specifically, we hypothesize that Repub-
lican circuit judges were more likely to respond to the attacks 
on legislative history than their Democratic counterparts, and 
that judges who joined the bench during or after these attacks 
were more likely to be influenced than their counterparts who 
were appointed before the attacks.  Utilizing a dataset con-
taining all published federal appellate court majority opinions 
between 1965 and 2011 (more than 240,000 opinions), we 
find that, for both hypotheses, the judges whom we would 
expect to be more influenced by the attacks on legislative his-
tory were in fact less likely than their counterparts to cite 
statements from floor debates or committee hearings, tradi-
tionally regarded as among the least reliable forms of legisla-
tive history.  But they were more likely than their counterparts 
to cite committee reports, traditionally regarded as the most 
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reliable form of legislative history.  The attacks on legislative 
history thus seem to have had the effect of pushing judges 
who might be expected to be influenced to (re)examine their 
treatment of legislative history but not (as Scalia had advo-
cated) to avoid citing it.  Instead, they adopted what had been 
the consensus approach for most of the twentieth century. 
Scalia influenced, but he did not persuade. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I think [Justice Scalia] is going to go down as one of the most 
important, most historic figures in the Court, and . . . I think 
the primary reason for that is that Justice Scalia has taught 
everybody how to do statutory interpretation differently, and 
I really do mean pretty much taught everybody.  You know 
there’s that classic phrase that we’re all realists now.  Well I 
think we’re all textualists now in a way that just was not 
remotely true when Justice Scalia joined the bench. 
Justice Elena Kagan1 
1 The 2015 Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the Read-
ing of Statutes, HARV. L. TODAY at 7:58 (Nov. 17, 2015), http://to-
day.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-discusses-statutory-interpretation 
[https://perma.cc/8AXR-5Z62]; see also Justice Elena Kagan on Supreme Court 
and Constitutional Law: McCormick Lecture at the University of Arizona Rogers 
College of Law, C-SPAN at 20:11 (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.c-span.org/video/ 
?414445-1/justice-elena-kagan-supreme-court-constitutional-law [https:// 
perma.cc/F5BM-YQKZ] (“I think [Scalia’s] truly long-lasting legacy is in the area 
of statutory interpretation, where he changed the way everybody does statutory 
interpretation.  It’s not just that he had his own distinctive method of interpreta-
tion.  He really just moved the whole field.”); Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and 
Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1057 (1998) 
(“[E]veryone must acknowledge the valuable and very significant achievement of 
Justice Scalia in recalling the attention of the legal community to the importance 
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The role of legislative history is a central issue in statutory 
interpretation.  Its use is the central methodological divide be-
tween textualists and purposivists or intentionalists.2  Until 
the 1970s, there was a fairly broad consensus in the U.S. Su-
preme Court (and among scholars) that it is appropriate for 
courts to utilize legislative history in interpreting statutes, and 
that there is a hierarchy of legislative history in terms of relia-
bility, reflecting the degree to which that legislative history is 
likely to shed light on Congress’s purpose in enacting the stat-
of text in statutory interpretation. In a significant sense, we are all textualists 
now.  The days when lawyers could ‘routinely . . . make no distinction between 
words in the text of a statute and words in its legislative history’ are surely over. 
Justice Scalia has very substantially affected the way scholars and judges think 
about statutory interpretation.”) (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in 
a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the 
Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 31 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)); Marjorie O. Rendell, 2003—A Year of Discov-
ery: Cybergenics and Plain Meaning in Bankruptcy Cases, 49 VILL. L. REV. 887, 
887 (2004) (beginning her article, written in her capacity as a circuit judge, by 
flatly stating that “[w]e are all textualists now.”); Diarmuid O’Scannlain, “We Are 
All Textualists Now”: The Legacy of Justice Antonin Scalia, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
303, 304 (2017) (circuit judge stating that we are all textualists now because of 
Scalia). 
Interestingly, Kagan attended law school from 1983 to 1986, so Scalia’s at-
tacks on legislative history began while she was in her last year of law school. See 
infra notes 19–25 and accompanying text (describing the rise of those attacks). 
2 See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Statutory Interpretations and the Therapy of the 
Obvious, 68 VAND. L. REV. 159, 159–60 (2015) (noting “Justice Antonin Scalia’s 
campaign to displace intentionalist or purposivist approaches to interpretation 
with what has come to be called ‘textualism,’ and his related effort to rule out 
reliance on legislative history.”); Andrew Tutt, Fifty Shades of Textualism, 29 J.L. 
& POL. 309, 324 (2014) (noting this distinction). 
As the names suggest, textualism looks only to statutory text, purposivism 
focuses on statutory purpose, and intentionalism focuses on legislative intent. 
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practi-
cal Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 324 (1990) (“The three main theories today 
emphasize (1) the actual or presumed intent of the legislature enacting the statute 
(‘intentionalism’); (2) the actual or presumed purpose of the statute (‘purposivism’ 
or ‘modified intentionalism’); and (3) the literal commands of the statutory text 
(‘textualism’).”).  The key for our purposes is that purposivists and intentionalists 
readily look to legislative history. See Nancy Staudt et al., Judging Statutes: 
Interpretive Regimes, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1909, 1938 n.113 (2005) (“Both an 
intentionalist and a purposivist will consult legislative history in making a deter-
mination.”).  Textualists, and in particular Justice Scalia’s brand of textualism, 
avoids invocation of legislative history. See Rubin, supra note 2; infra notes 
20–30 and accompanying text; infra note 57. 
Purposivism and intentionalism are sometimes lumped together, with inten-
tionalism sometimes treated as a form of purposivism and purposivism some-
times treated as a form of intentionalism.  Nothing turns on this categorization for 
our purposes, since both entail looking to legislative history.  As a convenient 
shorthand, we will refer to purposivism to encompass purposivism and 
intentionalism. 
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ute.3  That consensus about legislative history hierarchy 
eroded in the 1970s, as courts increasingly cited statements 
from floor debates and committee hearings, which had been 
considered among the least reliable forms of legislative 
history.4 
Starting in the mid-1980s, several prominent Republican 
federal appellate judges expressed doubts about courts’ relying 
on any legislative history.  Most prominent among these was 
D.C. Circuit Judge and then Justice Antonin Scalia.5  His 
prominence probably reflected his higher visibility (he was ele-
vated to the Supreme Court in 1986), the relentlessness of his 
attacks, and his clever use of language (and thus quotability). 
The assault on the use of legislative history thus became asso-
ciated first and foremost with Scalia, although he was by no 
means the only person expressing opposition to its use.6 
The attacks on legislative history were the key methodolog-
ical element of Scalia’s and others’ attacks on purposivism in 
statutory interpretation.  That is, their push against legislative 
history was part of their push against purposivism and in favor 
of textualism: courts should focus on the text that Congress 
actually enacted and should not try to determine Congress’s 
underlying purpose.  Tools like legislative history were not part 
of the text and thus should not be consulted.7 
Textualism versus purposivism, and in particular the de-
bate over the legitimacy of the use of legislative history, has 
been the biggest debate in statutory construction since the 
mid-1980s.  Indeed, it is fair to say that it has been the statu-
tory construction debate in the years since Scalia started his 
3 See infra notes 11–14 and accompanying text. 
4 The category of statements from floor debates encompasses all such state-
ments, including revised and extended remarks (which are not actually spoken on 
the floor but instead are inserted into the record).  Revised and extended remarks 
are not commonly cited, but we included them for completeness. 
More generally, one can think of the category of “statements from floor de-
bates and committee hearings” as all congressional debate.  And we refer to cita-
tions to “floor debates or committee hearings” to highlight that an opinion need 
cite only a floor debate or a committee hearing to be included in this category. 
5 See Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Admin-
istrative State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890–1950, 123 
YALE L.J. 266, 269 (2013) (“In the 1980s, legislative history was uncontroversial 
and very common. . . . Beginning in the late 1980s, however, a movement of 
judges and lawyers—led by Antonin Scalia—began to argue that this familiar 
interpretive resource was pernicious and should be banished from the judicial 
system.”). 
6 As we discuss below, see infra note 31 and accompanying text, in this 
article we will often refer to Scalia as a convenient shorthand for Scalia and 
others. 
7 See infra notes 36–39 and accompanying text. 
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attacks.8  Scalia not only raised the issue, but his attacks, and 
the responses to them, dominated all other statutory construc-
tion issues.  It is not even clear what would be in second place. 
The battles over legislative history and over textualism ver-
sus purposivism overlapped with ideology.  The leaders of the 
movement against legislative history and purposivism (and in 
favor of textualism) were ideological conservatives.9  The lead-
ing judicial defenders of legislative history and purposivism 
(and against textualism) were ideological liberals.10 
In this Article, we consider circuit judges’ reactions to the 
advocacy of textualism and the concomitant attacks on legisla-
tive history by testing two hypotheses: whether Republican cir-
cuit judges were more responsive to the attacks on legislative 
history than were their Democratic counterparts, and whether 
judges who started serving during the Reagan Administration 
or thereafter were more responsive to the attacks than were 
their earlier-appointed counterparts (who would have been de-
ciding statutory interpretation cases well before Scalia started 
attacking the use of legislative history).  To determine respon-
siveness we compare citations to legislative history, because 
the more a judge cites legislative history, the less that judge is 
following Scalia’s lead.  We find that, for both hypotheses, the 
judges whom we would expect to be more hostile to legislative 
history were in fact less likely than their counterparts to cite 
floor statements or committee hearings, which had been re-
garded as among the least reliable forms of legislative history. 
But they were actually more likely than their counterparts to 
cite committee reports, which had been regarded as the most 
reliable form of legislative history.  Thus the judges whom we 
expect to be more likely to be influenced by attacks on legisla-
tive history were in fact more influenced by them.  But the 
nature of that influence was, from Scalia’s standpoint, para-
doxical: the attacks on legislative history seem to have had the 
effect of pushing Republican and post-Reagan judges to 
(re)examine their approach to legislative history but not to 
avoid its use and thus not to accept Scalia’s approach.  In-
stead, they ended up adopting what had been the consensus 
8 Many thousands of pages of judicial opinions, law review articles, and 
books have been devoted to this debate.  For a sample, see sources supra notes 
1–2, infra notes 26–29, 33–34, and 52–72. 
9 See infra notes 21–23, 41–42 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 33–35, 49–52 and accompanying text; see also Comm’r of 
Internal Revenue v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739–43 (1989) (majority opinion by 
Justice Stevens with an extensive discussion of legislative history in light of statu-
tory ambiguity; Scalia joined all but the discussion of legislative history). 
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approach until the 1970s, and that defenders of legislative his-
tory in the mid-1980s and thereafter had advocated as an alter-
native to Scalia’s categorical opposition. 
Part I of this Article discusses the approaches to legislative 
history that preceded the attacks on its use and the develop-
ment of those attacks.  Part II considers the ideological valence 
of the attacks on legislative history and concomitant support 
for textualism.  This Part lays out our hypotheses regarding 
differences based on the political party of the appointing Presi-
dent and a judge’s appointment before Ronald Reagan became 
President.  Part III lays out the data and measures we use to 
test our hypotheses.  Part IV presents and discusses our 
results. 
We find that Scalia’s influence was more nuanced and less 
complete than he wanted, and also less than our hypotheses 
predicted: after Scalia’s attacks, Republican circuit judges be-
came less likely to cite statements from floor debates or com-
mittee hearings than their Democratic counterparts, and 
judges appointed by Reagan or later Presidents (regardless of 
party) became less likely to cite such statements than their 
earlier-appointed counterparts.  But the Republican and later-
appointed judges became more likely than their counterparts 
to cite committee reports.  Part V discusses the implications of 
our results. 
I 
THE JUDICIAL USE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, AND 
ATTACKS ON IT 
For most of the twentieth century, there was a fairly broad 
consensus in the U.S. Supreme Court (and among scholars) 
that it is appropriate for courts to utilize legislative history in 
interpreting statutes, and that there is a hierarchy of legislative 
history in terms of reliability, reflecting the degree to which that 
legislative history is likely to shed light on congressional intent. 
The Supreme Court in 1921 flatly stated that 
By repeated decisions of this court it has come to be well 
established that the debates in Congress expressive of the 
views and motives of individual members are not a safe 
guide, and hence may not be resorted to, in ascertaining the 
meaning and purpose of the law-making body. But reports of 
committees of House or Senate stand upon a more solid foot-
ing, and may be regarded as an exposition of the legislative 
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intent in a case where otherwise the meaning of a statute is 
obscure.11 
The Court had similar pronouncements from the late nine-
teenth century to the mid-1980s, relying on committee reports 
and presenting them as the most reliable form of legislative 
history, and abjuring reliance on floor statements on the 
grounds that they are among the least reliable.12  Legal com-
11 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 474 (1921) (citations 
omitted). 
12 See Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (“In surveying legisla-
tive history we have repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the 
Legislature’s intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, which ‘represen[t] 
the considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in 
drafting and studying proposed legislation.’  We have eschewed reliance on the 
passing comments of one Member, and casual statements from the floor de-
bates.”) (citations omitted); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969) (“A committee 
report represents the considered and collective understanding of those Congress-
men involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation. Floor debates reflect 
at best the understanding of individual Congressmen. It would take extensive and 
thoughtful debate to detract from the plain thrust of a committee report.”); United 
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385 (1968) (declining to put any weight on floor 
statements, and stating that “if we were to examine legislative purpose in the 
instant case, we would be obliged to consider not only these statements but also 
the more authoritative reports of the Senate and House Armed Services Commit-
tees”); Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 90 (1914) (“Counsel for petitioner cites the 
debates in Congress as indicating that the act was not understood to refer to any 
others than immigrants.  But the unreliability of such debates as a source from 
which to discover the meaning of the language employed in an act of Congress has 
been frequently pointed out, and we are not disposed to go beyond the reports of 
the committees.”) (citations omitted); Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486, 495 
(1904) (stating that courts should not consult congressional debates but could 
consider legislative reports to “determin[e] the scope of statutes passed on the 
strength of such reports”); see also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 n.7 
(1986) (plurality opinion) (“We have repeatedly recognized that the authoritative 
source for legislative intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill.”); Chrysler 
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 310–11 (1979) (relying on a committee report and 
stating that “[t]he remarks of a single legislator, even the sponsor, are not control-
ling in analyzing legislative history”); Gay v. Ruff, 292 U.S. 25, 38 (1934) (“The 
report of the Judiciary Committee of the House which recommended the adoption 
of the 1916 amendment establishes that such was the sole purpose of Con-
gress.”); United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1897) 
(noting “a general acquiescence in the doctrine that debates in congress are not 
appropriate sources of information from which to discover the meaning of the 
language of a statute passed by that body”). 
These legislative history sources are longstanding.  The Congressional Globe 
began publishing verbatim transcripts of floor debates in 1850. See Parrillo, 
supra note 5, at 272.  The Globe was succeeded by the Congressional Record in 
1873, and by the 46th Congress (1879-81) it ran to 10,000 pages. Id.  As for 
committee reports, the House made them mandatory in 1880, and the Senate 
issued them on most bills by 1900. Id.  Finally, congressional committees began 
publishing their hearings in the nineteenth century, and by 1910, 500–650 hear-
ing transcripts were published per year. See id.  As Parrillo also notes, through 
the middle of the twentieth century those materials were often difficult to gather 
for those who did not have access to an excellent library, which gave a huge 
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mentators in this period recognized this hierarchy as well.13  As 
commentators noted, Senators and Representatives often 
looked to conference and committee reports to understand the 
bill they were voting on.14 
Starting around 1970, citations to legislative history in-
creased dramatically in the Supreme Court and in circuit 
courts (and particularly in the D.C. Circuit, which hears a dis-
proportionate share of challenges to actions by administrative 
advantage to government agencies in marshaling legislative history materials dur-
ing the New Deal and World War II. See id. at 321–38. 
13 See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 155 
(1975) (“Materials in hearings and floor debates are so heterogeneous and frag-
mentary and so influenced by the tactics of promoting enactment that they have 
almost no credibility for the purposes of later interpretation.”); id. at 158 (“Much 
more reliable are the explanations, in committee or conference reports, of the 
purposes behind proposed legislation.  These are some of the very rare kinds of 
legislative history that can make a respectable showing on the scale of reliabil-
ity.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 636 
(1990) (presenting a hierarchy of legislative history sources from most to least 
authoritative, with committee reports as the most authoritative and floor and 
hearing colloquy considerably less authoritative); George A. Costello, Average 
Voting Members and Other “Benign Fictions”: The Relative Reliability of Committee 
Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 39 DUKE L.J. 39, 
40–41 (1990) (discussing “the hierarchy courts have established among the prin-
cipal sources of legislative history (committee reports have been considered the 
most reliable, floor debates and hearings less so).”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
Philip P. Frickey, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION 
OF PUBLIC POLICY 709, 717 (1st ed. 1988) (“Most scholars and judges agree that 
committee reports should be considered as authoritative legislative history and 
should be given great weight . . . . Unlike statements from committee reports, 
statements made during committee hearings and floor debates have traditionally 
been given very little weight by courts and commentators.”); JAMES WILLARD HURST, 
DEALING WITH STATUTES 42, 43 (1982) (contrasting the Congressional Record with 
committee reports, and noting of the latter: “Most influential are the reports of the 
legislative committees that considered the bill that became the statute.  It is an 
appropriate emphasis, because the committee is normally the workplace in which 
members have hammered out the particular content of the measure.”); Elizabeth 
A. McNellie, The Use of Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Popularly Enacted 
Legislation, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 162–63 (1989) (“Committee hearings are prob-
ably the lowest form of extrinsic aid in the hierarchy of the traditional model. 
Generally, hearings are relegated to this role because of the extreme likelihood 
that no one other than the committee itself will hear the testimony and because it 
is assumed that any relevant statements will be reflected in the committee re-
port.”).  More recent sources agree. See, e.g., ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STAT-
UTES 38 (2014) (contrasting committee reports and conference committee reports, 
which are “authoritative materials,” with other forms of legislative history like 
floor statements). 
14 See, e.g., Forrest Maltzman & Charles R. Shipan, Change, Continuity, and 
the Evolution of the Law, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 252, 260 (2008) (noting that the 
legislative meaning of laws to interest groups and legislators is often based on the 
agreements reached in conference reports); Alexander Bolton & Sharece Thrower, 
Legislative Capacity and Executive Unilateralism, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 649, 652–54 
(2016) (noting the limited time and resources for members of Congress and their 
staff and their reliance on committee reports). 
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agencies).15  And the composition of legislative history citations 
changed: courts became much more likely to cite statements 
from floor debates or committee hearings.  As we noted above, 
such statements had been regarded as among the least reliable 
forms of legislative history.  Particularly relevant for our pur-
poses, our data in this Article demonstrate (see Figure 1) that 
federal appellate court citations to these statements increased 
very dramatically in the 1970s through the early 1980s.  Thus, 
in this period, the consensus hierarchy that had existed for 
most of the twentieth century lost some of its force.  And, more 
generally, reliance on legislative history exploded. 
A 1982 article containing the first statistical analysis of the 
Supreme Court’s use of legislative history canvassed the litera-
ture on legislative history and concluded that there was “al-
most absolute acceptance” of legislative history, stating flatly 
that “[w]e can safely assume now, that the doubts and vacilla-
tions of the past in the adequate use of [legislative history] have 
vanished.”16  This position accurately reflected both scholarly 
commentary and judicial practice.  Indeed, some courts em-
phasized the importance of legislative history in interpreting a 
statute.  Notable in this regard is a major Supreme Court case 
15 See David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court 
and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653, 1716 fig.5 (2010) 
(showing an increase in Supreme Court citations to legislative history starting in 
1970 and a decline starting in the mid-1980s); Glenn Bridgman, One of These 
Things Is Not Like the Others: Legislative History in the U.S. Courts of Appeal, YALE 
STUDENT PRIZE PAPERS 1, 9, 25–27, 34 (2012) (presenting evidence of a dramatic 
increase of Supreme Court and federal appellate citations to legislative history 
starting around 1970 and a decrease starting in the mid-1980s and noting that “a 
greater percentage of the cases on the D.C. Circuit’s docket involve statutory 
interpretation, and the D.C. Circuit has correspondingly more opportunities to 
cite legislative history.”); Parrillo, supra note 5, at 389–90 (discussing the increase 
in Supreme Court and federal appellate court citations to legislative history from 
the early 1970s through the early 1980s and the drop thereafter, and noting that 
the willingness to review statutes and agency actions may have become more 
pronounced in the D.C. Circuit in the early 1970s as compared to other judicial 
circuit, as “a rising disenchantment with bureaucracy led the judiciary and espe-
cially the D.C. Circuit to become far more independent, willful, and aggressive in 
reviewing the actions of agencies than in the preceding generation”). 
16 Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of 
Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS 294, 296–97 (1982); 
see also HURST, supra note 13, at 42 (“The twentieth-century approach is to be 
prepared and willing to give weight to particular legislative history.”); Patricia M. 
Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme 
Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 197–98 (1983) (“Not once last Term was the 
Supreme Court sufficiently confident of the clarity of statutory language not to 
double check its meaning with the legislative history.  The language of ‘plain 
meaning’ lingers on in Court opinions, but its spirit is gone.  In its application of 
the plain meaning rule, the Court now shifts onto legislative history the burden of 
proving that the words do not mean what they appear to say.”). 
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from 1971, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, in 
which the majority, in interpreting a statute, stated: “The legis-
lative history of [the statutes] is ambiguous. . . . Because of this 
ambiguity it is clear that we must look primarily to the statutes 
themselves to find the legislative intent.”17  Among the many 
judges who invoked legislative history in the early 1980s was 
then-Judge Scalia.18 
As it turned out, the 1982 article was published shortly 
before Scalia and other judges started arguing that the courts 
were using legislative history too profligately.19  As we noted 
17 401 U.S. 402, 412 n.29 (1971).  In one of his attacks on the use of legisla-
tive history, Scalia highlighted similar language from a more recent brief: 
I respectfully decline to join [the majority’s legislative history] dis-
cussion, however, because it is natural for the bar to believe that the 
juridical importance of such material matches its prominence in our 
opinions—thus producing a legal culture in which, when counsel 
arguing before us assert that “Congress has said” something, they 
now frequently mean, by “Congress,” a committee report; and in 
which it was not beyond the pale for a recent brief to say the follow-
ing: “Unfortunately, the legislative debates are not helpful.  Thus, 
we turn to the other guidepost in this difficult area, statutory 
language.” 
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 529–30 (1989) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 24, Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 
U.S. 701 (1989) (No. 87–2084)). 
18 See, e.g., Asociacion de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States, 735 F.2d 
1517, 1524 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“The legislative history makes clear that for the 
exception of § 1605(a)(5) to apply ‘the tortious act or omission must occur within 
the jurisdiction of the United States.’”) (quoting a House report); Toney v. Block, 
705 F.2d 1364, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Tamm, J., concurring) (“The legislative 
history of Title VII clearly shows that Congress’ intent in providing for awards of 
back pay to successful plaintiffs was to provide a ‘make whole’ remedy.”) (quoting 
the Congressional Record), abrogated by Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228 (1989); Int’l Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agric. Implement Work-
ers of Am. v. Donovan, 746 F.2d 855, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“While we would not 
normally interpret the reference to include the section prior to its amendment, the 
language is at least susceptible of that interpretation.  And the legislative history 
indicates this is precisely what was meant.”); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus, 
747 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that “[f]ar from contradicting [the text’s] 
ordinary meaning, both the surrounding text of the statute and its legislative 
history tend to confirm it,” and then discussing legislative history); Simmons v. 
ICC, 716 F.2d 40, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“In our view, the legislative history of the 
Act of January 2, 1975, suggests, like its text, that in all respects not explicitly 
stated the ICC is to be treated like other agencies subject to the Hobbs Act.”); 
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. ICC, 761 F.2d 746, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“The legislative 
history of the APA makes it entirely clear (if reason alone does not suffice) that 
such a strange result was not intended.”); Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. ICC, 697 
F.2d 1146, 1148–52 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting and discussing legislative history at 
length); Romero v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc., 749 F.2d 77, 82–83 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (quoting and discussing legislative history). 
19 Even more striking was the timing of Judge Richard Posner’s book THE 
FEDERAL  COURTS (1985).  In it, Posner noted that there had been a debate over 
whether judges should ever cite legislative history but characterized it as “now 
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above, Scalia’s (and others’) critiques of legislative history were 
part and parcel of their advocacy of textualism.  As we also 
noted, the debate between textualism and purposivism, and 
thus the debate over the use of legislative history, had an ideo-
logical valence: the leading advocates of applying textualism 
and ignoring legislative history were ideologically conservative. 
The first prominent judicial opinion articulating misgivings 
about the use of legislative history was then-Judge Scalia’s 
concurring opinion in Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission.20  Scalia’s doubts about legislative history in Hir-
schey achieved particular prominence because the following 
summer he was nominated to the Supreme Court.  At his con-
firmation hearing, no fewer than four Senators commented 
(mostly negatively) on his approach to legislative history in Hir-
schey, and Scalia himself stated that if he “could create the 
world anew,” he would get rid of legislative history.21  Other 
(mainly Republican) circuit judges also noticed Hirschey and 
academic.” Id. at 269.  Within months of the book’s publication the debate was no 
longer academic. 
20 777 F.2d 1, 7–8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring).  Interestingly, 
Scalia’s critique in Hirschey was relatively mild in comparison to his blanket 
denunciations of legislative history on the Supreme Court, and the subject of his 
ire was the majority’s reliance on a House committee report (which conventionally 
had been considered to be the most reliable form of legislative history). See id. 
Scalia stated: “I frankly doubt that it is ever reasonable to assume that the details, 
as opposed to the broad outlines of purpose, set forth in a committee report come 
to the attention of, much less are approved by, the house which enacts the 
committee’s bill.” Id. (footnote omitted).  He expanded on this latter point in a 
speech that he gave at many law schools between the fall of 1985 and the spring of 
1986, just before his Supreme Court nomination: 
As an intermediate federal judge, I can hardly ignore legislative his-
tory when I know it will be used by the Supreme Court. . . .  I 
suppose I would rank most highly legislative history consisting of 
amendments defeated on the floor. . . .  I suppose next to that would 
be extended floor debate—at least in circumstances, which occa-
sionally occur, where the final text is actually being crafted on the 
floor.  At the bottom of the list I would place—what hitherto seems to 
have been placed at the top: the committee report. 
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. 
REV. 423, 442 n.64 (1988) (excerpting this speech). 
Thus, then-Judge Scalia would have most squarely rejected invocation of 
committee reports.  And one of the judges who joined Scalia in his attacks on 
legislative history, then-D.C. Circuit Judge Kenneth Starr, adopted a similar view, 
stating that “only the record of speeches on the floor of either chamber should be 
considered even minimally probative of Congress’s intent . . . [because only] those 
remarks have been heard—however superficially—by members of Congress (al-
beit a minority in most instances).”  Kenneth Starr, Observations About the Use of 
Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 375–76.  By contrast, on the Supreme 
Court, Scalia generally rejected invocation of any legislative history. See infra 
notes 24–25 and accompanying text; infra note 57. 
21 Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th 
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echoed its concerns.  The first was Judge Alex Kozinski of the 
Ninth Circuit, who in a 1986 concurrence emphasized that 
“Judge (now Justice) Scalia has persuasively warned against 
relying on detailed discussions in legislative reports,” and fol-
Cong. 105–06 (1986); Id. at 65–68, 74–75, 105–07 (comments of Senators 
Grassley, Heflin, Simon, and Mathias, and Scalia statement). 
Following up on a suggestion from Abbe Gluck, we asked Duke Research 
Librarian Wickliffe Shreve to review the transcripts of the nomination hearings of 
other Justices for questions about legislative history in statutory interpretation. 
In pre-Scalia Senate Supreme Court confirmation hearings, he found only one 
question about the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation (though 
the transcription of some hearings made it hard to do searches on them, so it is 
possible that he missed a question in other hearings): then-Judge O’Connor was 
asked “What is your approach in construing specific statutes? Would you feel 
constrained by the language of the statute and the legislative history or would you 
feel empowered to imply or create a consensus that might not have existed in the 
legislative branch?” The Nomination of Sandra Day O’Connor of Arizona to Serve 
as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 134 (1981). 
After Scalia joined the Court, by contrast, nominees were frequently asked for 
their views about the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation, and the 
questioning Senator often invoked Scalia by name. See, e.g., Nomination of Judge 
Clarence Thomas to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: 
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 1, 102d Cong. 213 (1991) 
(“Judge Scalia testified here, and has practiced it as a Justice, that in looking at 
history, he is not going to look to the committee reports, he is not going to look to 
congressional debate, he is going to look at the statute and just determine con-
gressional intent from the language of the statute. Is that where you are going to 
get congressional intent?”); Nomination of David H. Souter to Be Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 130–31 (1990) (“[T]o what extent do you believe the legisla-
tive history should be taken into consideration, if you were sitting on the Supreme 
Court interpreting a statute passed by the Congress?”);Nomination of Stephen G. 
Breyer to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: 
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 170 (1994) (“You and I, 
I think, share a similar view on the use of legislative history in the interpretation of 
statutes, unlike, for instance, the way I view Justice Scalia not wanting to look at 
legislative history.  You, have written Law Review articles about it, and from a 
reading of your cases, I can also see that you are willing to rely on legislative 
history.”); Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Be Associate Justice of the Su-
preme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
103d Cong. 223–25 (1993) (“There are jurists who argue that the Court should 
disregard the tradition of looking to the legislative history of a law to determine 
how Congress intended that it be executed, and under this view they should look 
to the language in the four corners of the statute to resolve any ambiguities and 
not to committee reports, floor speeches, or any other items that might accom-
pany a bill through the legislative process.  Now, the proponents argue, as one has 
said, that ‘judicial abdication to a fictitious legislative intent’ would occur were 
you to look for congressional intent, and that legislative history itself is ‘the last 
hope of lost interpretive causes.’  Do you agree with that statement?”) (quoting 
Scalia; the Senator later stated, “For the benefit of my colleagues, the language 
that I quoted earlier, about judicial abdication to a fictitious legislative intent, that 
was Justice Scalia who articulated that position.”  Justice Ginsburg drily (or 
perhaps drolly) responded “I am well aware of his position.”).  Interestingly, all 
these nominees responded that legislative history is an appropriate source. 
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lowed with a block quote from Scalia’s opinion in Hirschey and 
a discussion of it.22  Soon other circuit judges followed Scalia’s 
lead, citing Hirschey.23 
Scalia was just getting started.  In a series of concurring 
and dissenting opinions in his first few years on the Supreme 
Court, Scalia repeatedly criticized the use of legislative his-
tory.24  He declined to join majority opinions because they in-
22 Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) 
(Kozinski, J., concurring in the judgment). 
23 See Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1054–55 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(Ruth Bader Ginsburg, J.) (citing Scalia’s concurrence in Hirschey in stating that 
“[c]ommittee reports, we remind, do not embody the law. Congress, as Judge 
Scalia recently noted, votes on the statutory words, not on different expressions 
packaged in committee reports”), aff’d by equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 1 (1987); 
ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1583 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., dissenting) (stating 
that “[w]e in the judiciary have become shamelessly profligate and unthinking in 
our use of legislative history” and citing Scalia’s concurrence in Hirschey); In re 
Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) (criticizing reliance 
on legislative history and invoking Scalia’s concurrence in Hirschey).  In contrast 
to other early supporters of Scalia’s Hirschey concurrence, Judge (and later Jus-
tice) Ruth Bader Ginsburg was a Democratic judge.  But her opinion in Abourezk 
turned out not to presage support for his attacks on legislative history. See infra 
note 41. 
24 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452–55 (1987) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (“Judges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators’ intentions. 
Where the language of those laws is clear, we are not free to replace it with an 
unenacted legislative intent.”); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191–92 
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Committee reports, floor speeches, and even collo-
quies between Congressmen, are frail substitutes for bicameral vote upon the text 
of a law and its presentment to the President.”) (citation omitted); United States v. 
Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 344–46 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It should not be 
possible, or at least should not be easy, to be sure of obtaining a particular result 
in this Court without making that result apparent on the face of the bill which 
both Houses consider and vote upon, which the President approves, and which, if 
it becomes law, the people must obey.  I think we have an obligation to conduct 
our exegesis in a fashion which fosters that democratic process.”). 
Brudney and Ditslear choose 1986 as their cut-off point because of Scalia’s 
ascension to the Court in that year, noting that “[u]pon becoming a Justice in the 
1986 Term, Justice Scalia began to express relentless opposition to colleagues’ 
use of legislative history.”  James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ 
Reliance on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKE-
LEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 161 (2008).  As they further note (in a section entitled 
“Justice Scalia’s Line in the Sand”): 
During his first three terms on the Court, Justice Scalia authored a 
series of separate opinions—including at least eight concurring in 
the Court’s judgment—in which he expressly attacked or ques-
tioned the majority’s reliance on legislative history.  In these sepa-
rate writings, Scalia insisted that the Court should not use 
legislative history to confirm or reinforce the plain meaning of text, 
that legislative history is very likely to be generated for strategic or 
insincere reasons, and that in any event it is highly unreliable.  He 
also asserted on several occasions that courts must discover a stat-
ute’s purpose or intent only from analyzing the text and not from the 
vagaries of a legislative record drafted or understood by, at best, 
small subgroups of members. 
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voked legislative history.25  Other Justices, most notably 
Justice Clarence Thomas, sometimes joined him in declining to 
join opinions that cited legislative history, but no other Justice 
categorically rejected legislative history the way Scalia did.26 
Scalia’s lack of full adherents in the Supreme Court meant 
that his attacks on legislative history never achieved a majority 
in the Court for broadly rejecting legislative history.27  But his 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
25 See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98–99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (“It is neither compatible with our judicial responsibility of assuring rea-
soned, consistent, and effective application of the statutes of the United States, 
nor conducive to a genuine effectuation of congressional intent, to give legislative 
force to each snippet of analysis, and even every case citation, in committee 
reports that are increasingly unreliable evidence of what the voting Members of 
Congress actually had in mind.”).  In 1997, he even pointedly refused to join a 
footnote (although he joined everything else in the majority opinion) that merely 
explained why “[w]e give no weight to the legislative history[.]” See Assocs. Com-
mercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 955 n.† (1997) (noting that Scalia joined the 
entire majority opinion except footnote 4, which contained the explanation for the 
Court’s refusal to give weight to the legislative history). 
In a few cases (mainly in his first years at the Court), Scalia did cite legislative 
history. See United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (citing a 
Senate report); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (citing a 
conference report).  So, though his citations to legislative history were rare, they 
did exist.  Nonetheless, and unsurprisingly, given his many broadsides against 
invocation of legislative history, Scalia’s position quickly came to be associated 
with the rejection of its invocation. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 20, at 423 
(criticizing “Justice Scalia’s argument that legislative intent should be considered 
irrelevant even when it can be determined.”); The Supreme Court, 1988 Term— 
Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REV. 320, 323 n. 28 (1989) (“As an analytical matter, 
Justice Scalia rejects reliance on legislative history as a means of interpreting 
statutes.”); supra note 2; infra notes 206–30.  The broader point for our purposes 
is that the more a court cites legislative history, the less it is following Scalia. See 
infra note 57 and accompanying text. 
26 See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 
146–47 n.169 (2011) (“Justice Scalia has expressed that view in a number of well-
known separate opinions declining to join opinions of the Court that relied on 
legislative history. Justice Thomas has not taken the same categorical stance 
against legislative history that Justice Scalia has. From time to time, however, 
Justice Thomas will decline to join an opinion of the Court simply because of its 
citation on legislative history.” (internal citations omitted)); Jonathan R. Siegel, 
Judicial Interpretation in the Cost-Benefit Crucible, 92 MINN. L. REV. 387, 408–09, 
409 n.158 (2007) (“For nearly twenty years now, Justice Scalia has engaged in a 
sustained campaign against reliance on legislative history, and some other judges 
have signed on. . . . Justice Thomas, for example, although not as doctrinaire 
about the matter as Justice Scalia, has occasionally joined him in rejecting the 
validity of reliance on legislative history.” (footnotes omitted)). 
27 See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Legacy of Justice Scalia and His Textualist 
Ideal, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 858 (2017) (footnotes omitted): 
Although Justice Scalia’s textualist campaign had tremendous in-
fluence, it never achieved its final victory. Notwithstanding all the 
time and energy he devoted to promoting textualism, Justice Scalia 
never persuaded the Supreme Court to abandon reliance on legisla-
tive history. The Court never ceased to consult statutory purpose. 
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attacks quickly attracted wide attention.  By the end of the 
1980s, Scalia’s campaign against the use of legislative history 
was well known among judges and scholars.28  He precipitated 
Most of all, the Court never adopted Justice Scalia’s fundamental 
textualist axiom: “The text is the law.” 
See also Stephanie Wald, The Use of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation 
Cases in the 1992 U.S. Supreme Court Term; Scalia Rails but Legislative History 
Remains on Track, 23 SW. U. L. REV. 47, 47 (1993) (making the point in the title of 
the article). 
28 See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, supra note 20, at 437 (“One time-honored 
source of legislative intent is the legislative history of the statute.  Recently, how-
ever, Justice Scalia has roundly attacked the current judicial practice of routinely 
considering legislative history.” (footnotes omitted)); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpret-
ing Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 429–30 (1989) (“In 
recent years, the Supreme Court has been divided about the significance of legis-
lative intent and legislative history. The Court has suggested that the question for 
interpretation is in fact one of ‘congressional intent,’ and has generally treated 
legislative history as a key to the identification of ‘intent.’ Justice Scalia, however, 
has expressed considerable doubt about legislative intent in general and legisla-
tive history in particular. . . . Above all, Justice Scalia argues the legislative 
history was never enacted and is therefore not law.” (footnotes omitted)); Marshall 
J. Breger, Introductory Remarks: Conference on Statutory Interpretation, 1987 
DUKE L.J. 362, 368–69  (noting Scalia’s opposition to the use of legislative history); 
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 38 
(1988) (“If one adopts Justice Scalia’s version of textualism, the question becomes 
a matter of the sources from which one derives the ‘plain meaning’ of the text. 
Scalia’s anti-intentionalism studiously avoids examining legislative history for 
such meaning.” (footnotes omitted)); Bruce Fein, Scalia’s Way, 76 ABA J. 38, 38, 
41 (1990) (noting that within a few short years of joining the Supreme Court’s 
bench, Justice Scalia was able to generate a great amount of attention to his 
campaign against invocation of legislative history); Arthur Stock, Justice Scalia’s 
Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: How Congress Al-
ways Loses, 1990 DUKE L.J. 160, 160  (“One source Justice Scalia views as im-
proper is the legislative history compiled by Congress.  Though his antipathy 
toward legislative history was known before he joined the Supreme Court, over 
time he has reasserted this view with renewed vigor.” (footnotes omitted)); 
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward 
a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1296–97 
(1990) (“With increasing frequency and tenor Justice Scalia has challenged the 
Court’s traditional approach to interpreting statutes. . . . As part of this textualist 
theory, Justice Scalia has targeted the Court’s longstanding reliance on legislative 
history to interpret statutes.”); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of 
Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States 
Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 281 (1990) [hereinafter Wald, Sizzling 
Sleeper] (“[T]here now exists a fully articulated and quite aggressive assault in the 
Supreme Court on the use of legislative history in construing statutes.  The move-
ment’s spiritual leader is Justice Scalia.” (footnote omitted)).  Judge Wald summa-
rized Scalia’s attacks as follows: 
Justice Scalia’s textualist critique is not quite the same thing as the 
old plain meaning rule to which American judges have always given 
at least lip service.  The plain meaning rule basically articulated a 
hierarchy of sources from which to divine legislative intent.  Text 
came first, and if it is clearly dispositive, then the inquiry is at an 
end.  But legislative history still has an important role to play as 
long as statutory text is not entirely “plain.” According to the textu-
alists, however, the problem with legislative history is not that it is 
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a major debate among jurists and scholars on the legitimacy of 
courts invoking legislative history in statutory interpretation.29 
In just a few years starting in the mid-1980s, Scalia not only 
challenged what had seemed to be a settled practice (citing 
legislative history) but also, through a combination of promi-
nence and relentlessness, pushed the debate to center stage 
among judges and scholars.30 
As the discussion above indicates, Scalia was by no means 
alone in his campaign against judicial invocation of legislative 
less authoritative than statutory language; rather, the textualists 
assert that Congress has a voice as a constitutional player only 
through its finally enacted statutes, no through any supplementary 
explanation thereof, and so legislative history is reduced to the sta-
tus of “unauthoritative materials.” 
Patricia M. Wald, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Remarks 
at U.S. Law Week’s Annual Constitutional Law Conference 7-8 (Sept. 8–9, 1989). 
Notably, there are no secondary sources in the Westlaw database containing 
“Scalia” in the same sentence as “legislative history” through 1985, but nineteen 
such sources through 1987, forty-five through 1988, and seventy-three through 
1989.  The Westlaw database added publications to its database during this time, 
but not nearly at that explosive rate. 
29 See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, “Plain Meaning”: Justice Scalia’s Juris-
prudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 401–02 
(1994) (discussing the arguments over the permissibility of invocation of legisla-
tive history in statutory interpretation); Margaret H. Lemos, The Politics of Statu-
tory Interpretation, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 858–65, 874–77 (2013) (reviewing 
ANTONIN  SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING  LAW: THE  INTERPRETATION OF  LEGAL 
TEXTS (2012)) (same); Manning, supra note 26, at 165–74 (same); Stephen A. 
Plass, The Illusion and Allure of Textualism, 40 VILL. L. REV. 93, 101 (1995) (same); 
James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political Branch Interpretive 
Assets, 98 CALIF. L. REV 1199, 1216–24 (2010) (comparing textualist and 
purposivist interpretive approaches from the standpoint of legitimacy). 
30 In addition to the sources cited above, see Eskridge, supra note 13, at 
624–25 (“Justice Scalia’s new textualism is a radical, as opposed to marginal, 
critique. It is a bold rethinking of the Court’s role. Partly because of its analytical 
boldness, and partly because Justice Scalia is an intellectually aggressive mem-
ber of the Court, the critique has already changed the Court’s practice in statutory 
interpretation cases.”). 
Costello began his 1990 article as follows: 
The Supreme Court is beginning to reexamine old approaches to 
statutory interpretation.  With the increased mass and complexity of 
federal statutes over the last six decades, courts have turned in-
creasingly to legislative history when faced with issues of statutory 
interpretation.  The eagerness of many courts to examine congres-
sional materials prompted the joke that under the “American rule,” 
examination of statutory text is permissible only when legislative 
history is ambiguous.  Now underway in the Supreme Court is a 
challenge, led by Justice Scalia, to routine reliance on legislative 
history as an aid to statutory interpretation.  This challenge extends 
beyond merely curbing excesses occasioned by overreliance on leg-
islative history.  With increasing frequency, the Court emphasizes 
statutory language and structure and deemphasizes the role of leg-
islative history. 
Costello, supra note 13, at 39. 
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history.  But his opposition to legislative history was categori-
cal, he was on the Supreme Court, he repeatedly attacked the 
use of legislative history, and his language was sharp (and 
quotable).  Scalia was most closely associated with the cam-
paign against the use of legislative history in deciding cases, 
and indeed there is a consensus that Scalia brought the issue 
to the fore and led the movement.31  In this Article, we will refer 
to Justice Scalia as a convenient shorthand for Scalia and 
others in recognition of his status as the leader of the campaign 
against the use of legislative history.  Relatedly, although it is of 
course impossible to know, it seems reasonable to assume that 
there would have been a movement against legislative history if 
Scalia had never existed.32  That said, without a Supreme 
Court Justice forcefully making the case against the invocation 
of legislative history, the movement very likely would not have 
been as prominent and would not have occasioned the many 
judicial opinions and law review articles by judges and profes-
sors addressing the issue. 
There was a robust response to the attacks, led by promi-
nent ideological liberal judges and law professors who sup-
ported the use of legislative history.  But Scalia seems to have 
changed the terrain from where it had been in the 1970s 
through the mid-1980s: those who advocated the use of legisla-
tive history stated that of course they began with the statutory 
text, and that legislative history should be used carefully but is 
especially appropriate when the text is ambiguous. 
As to what materials to cite, some who opposed the attacks 
on legislative history defended invocation, when appropriate, of 
all forms of legislative history.  Notably, then-Judge Stephen 
Breyer gave a prominent lecture in 1991 defending the use of 
all forms of legislative history as possibly relevant to statutory 
31 See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
32 Note that the first significant writing in this period that questioned legisla-
tive history was by another circuit judge appointed by President Reagan, Judge 
Frank Easterbrook, and preceded Hirschey.  In a brief 1983 essay, he suggested 
that courts too freely relied on legislative history.  Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ 
Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544–45 (1983).  It did not achieve the promi-
nence of Scalia’s broadsides against legislative history, and by the standards of 
the late 1980s its critique was relatively mild—indeed, Easterbrook suggested 
that good statutory construction includes looking at legislative history. See id. at 
550 (“Statutory construction is an art.  Good statutory construction requires the 
rarest of skills. The judge must find clues in the structure of the statute, hints in 
the legislative history, and combine these with mastery of history, command of 
psychology, and sensitivity to nuance to divine how deceased legislators would 
have answered unasked questions.”).  But it arguably helped to foster the debate 
over legislative history. 
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interpretation.33  More commonly, supporters of legislative his-
tory emphasized the hierarchy noted above, stating that ignor-
ing all legislative history was a mistake because committee 
reports were reliable even though statements from floor de-
bates and committee hearings generally were not.  Scalia’s D.C. 
Circuit colleague Judge Abner Mikva, for example, argued in 
favor of reliance on committee reports but not floor state-
ments.34  Indeed, some took the opportunity to say that Scalia 
had usefully drawn attention to the impropriety of citing unreli-
able legislative history like floor debates and committee hear-
ings, even as they also argued that Scalia went too far in also 
pushing for judges to ignore committee reports.35 
Thus the terms of the debate in the mid-1980s and thereaf-
ter were that a group of mainly ideologically conservative 
judges led by Scalia argued that courts should generally ignore 
all forms of legislative history and look only to statutory text, 
and a group of mainly ideologically liberal judges and law 
professors responded that courts should start with the text but 
should invoke legislative history to help flesh out the statutory 
language, in particular in cases of textual ambiguity.  This lat-
ter group tended to emphasize a hierarchy with committee re-
ports as reliable and statements made during floor debates and 
committee hearings as relatively unreliable.  So the battle lines 
were drawn: one group would avoid citing any form of legisla-
tive history, and the other group would cite committee reports 
but perhaps not to statements from floor debates or committee 
hearings. 
33 Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 847 (1992) (“Although I recognize the possible ‘rearguard’ 
nature of my task, I should like to defend the classical practice [of invoking 
legislative history] and convince you that those who attack it ought to claim 
victory once they have made judges more sensitive to problems of the abuse of 
legislative history; they ought not to condemn its use altogether.  They should 
confine their attack to the outskirts and leave the citadel at peace.”). 
34 See Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr’s Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 
380, 385 (“[Courts] must deal with the problem of resolving fine ambiguities in a 
statute, ambiguities where courts really do not know what a Congress had in 
mind. My approach is to go to the place in the legislative history where the 
majority did focus on the ambiguity.  To this end, I always find that the committee 
report is the most useful device; it is what I use to try to resolve some of those 
ambiguities.  Most of the time—not always, and not for every committee—the 
committee report represents the synthesis of the last meaningful discussion and 
debate on the issue.”); Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 28 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 181, 184 (1986) [hereinafter Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes] (“The 
committee report is the bone structure of the legislation. It is the road map that 
explains why things are in and things are out of the statute.”). 
35 See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 13, at 641–42; Farber & Frickey, supra note 
20, at 442–43; infra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. 
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II 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
A. The Ideological Quality of the Support for Attacks on 
the Use of Legislative History and the Responses 
to It 
Justice Scalia and others who attacked the use of legisla-
tive history and advocated for textualism articulated their con-
cerns in closely related terms of process and reliability.  Scalia 
repeatedly noted that the only thing on which Congress voted 
was the text of the legislation.36  Members might look to com-
mittee reports for guidance as to the meaning of provisions, but 
what they actually approved was the text itself, and nothing 
else.  Relatedly, because committee reports (and of course 
statements from floor debates and committee hearings) were 
not part of what Congress formally approved, one could not be 
confident that they accurately reflected the majority coali-
tion.37  And, even more strongly, members of the majority coali-
36 This is a theme that Scalia articulated even before he was elevated to the 
Supreme Court. See Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. ICC, 749 F.2d 875, 893 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Legislative compromise (which is to say most intelli-
gent legislation) becomes impossible when there is no assurance that the statu-
tory words in which it is contained will be honored.  Those members of Congress 
who unsuccessfully oppose a legislative initiative favored by the Executive have 
every reason to fear that any ambiguity they leave in the statute will be interpreted 
against their interests by the implementing agency.  But they also have every 
reason to trust that the clear limitations they succeed in imposing will be faith-
fully observed.  Those are the rules of the game.”); Eskridge, supra note 13, at 
653–54 (“Judge Scalia in 1985–86 argued that judicial inquiry into legislative 
intentions is inconsistent with our constitutional separation of powers. ‘Surely it 
is more consonant with that doctrine that—once a statute is enacted—its mean-
ing is to be determined on the basis of its text by the Executive officers charged 
with its enforcement and the Judicial officers charged with its application.’” (foot-
note omitted) (quoting the speech that Scalia delivered at many law schools be-
tween fall 1985 and spring 1986, supra note 20)); see also Starr, supra note 20, at 
375 (“Under democratic theory, the statute rather than extrastatutory materials 
governs the nation. Legislative history, however, has the potential to mute (or 
indeed override) the voice of the statute itself. In terms of democratic theory, the 
use of legislative history can distort the proper voice of each branch of our consti-
tutional government.”). 
37 See, e.g., United States v. Taylor 487 U.S. 326, 345 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“[I]t must be assumed that what the Members of the House and the 
Senators thought they were voting for, and what the President thought he was 
approving when he signed the bill, was what the text plainly said, rather than 
what a few Representatives, or even a Committee Report, said it said.”); Blanchard 
v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I am confident that 
only a small proportion of the Members of Congress read either one of the Com-
mittee Reports in question, even if (as is not always the case) the Reports hap-
pened to have been published before the vote; that very few of those who did read 
them set off for the nearest law library to check out what was actually said in the 
four cases at issue (or in the more than 50 other cases cited by the House and 
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tion would be unlikely to be moved by, or even know about, a 
colloquy on the floor or in a committee hearing between two 
members.38  Legislative history, Scalia suggested, was likely 
written by staffers or lobbyists who were attempting not to 
inform members of Congress but instead to influence judges’ 
interpretation of the statute.39 
Senate Reports).”); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (1989) (criticizing the majority’s invocation of committee reports 
and stating that “[t]he meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be deter-
mined, not on the basis of which meaning can be shown to have been understood 
by a larger handful of the Members of Congress; but rather on the basis of which 
meaning is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage, and thus most 
likely to have been understood by the whole Congress which voted on the words of 
the statute (not to mention the citizens subject to it), and (2) most compatible with 
the surrounding body of law into which the provision must be integrated—a 
compatibility which, by a benign fiction, we assume Congress always has in 
mind.”); Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 620 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“Assuming that all the members of the three Committees in question 
(as opposed to just the relevant Subcommittees) actually adverted to the interpre-
tive point at issue here—which is probably an unrealistic assumption—and as-
suming further that they were in unanimous agreement on the point, they would 
still represent less than two-fifths of the Senate, and less than one-tenth of the 
House.  It is most unlikely that many Members of either Chamber read the perti-
nent portions of the Committee Reports before voting on the bill—assuming (we 
cannot be sure) that the Reports were available before the vote.”); City of Chicago 
v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 337 (1994) (Scalia, J.) (“[I]t is the statute, and 
not the Committee Report, which is the authoritative expression of the law, and 
the statute prominently omits reference to generation.”). 
38 See, e.g., Overseas Educ. Ass’n, Inc. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 876 
F.2d 960, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Buckley, J., concurring) (“Far less reliable, as 
sources of statutory meaning, are remarks made during floor debate—even ‘au-
thoritative’ explanations offered by a bill’s sponsors.  While a sponsor’s state-
ments may reveal his understanding and intentions, they hardly provide definitive 
insights into Congress’ understanding of the meaning of a particular provision. 
Few of his fellow legislators will have been on hand to hear the gloss the sponsor 
may have placed on a particular provision.  Thus members of Congress, in voting 
on a measure, must be presumed to have relied on the meaning of the words read 
in context on a printed page.”); Scalia, supra note 1, at 32 (“In earlier days, when 
Congress had a smaller staff and enacted less legislation, it might have been 
possible to believe that a significant number of senators or representatives were 
present for the floor debate, or to read the committee reports, and actually voted 
on the basis of what they heard or read. Those days, if they ever existed, are long 
gone.  The floor is rarely crowded for a debate, the members being generally 
occupied with committee business and reporting to the floor only when a quorum 
call is demanded or a vote is to be taken.”). 
39 See, e.g., Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98–99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring): 
As anyone familiar with modern-day drafting of congressional com-
mittee reports is well aware, the references to the cases [cited by the 
majority] were inserted, at best by a committee staff member on his 
or her own initiative, and at worst by a committee staff member at 
the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist; and the purpose of those refer-
ences was not primarily to inform the Members of Congress what 
the bill meant . . . but rather to influence judicial construction. 
In his concurrence in United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326 (1988), Scalia quoted 
and criticized the following statement from a member of Congress: “I have an 
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Scalia and other textualists stated that their approach was 
not designed to favor one set of outcomes over another, and 
amendment here in my hand which could be offered, but if we can make up some 
legislative history which would do the same thing, I am willing to do it.” Id. at 345 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).  And in the book that inspired 
Judge Posner’s harsh review in The New Republic, quoted infra note 42, Scalia 
and Bryan Garner said: 
[W]hereas courts used to refer to legislative history because it exis-
ted, today it exists—in all its ever-increasing, profuse detail—be-
cause the courts refer to it. Legislators engage in floor colloquies 
(again, typically before an empty house) precisely to induce courts to 
accept their views about how the statute works.  (They have been 
known to preface a colloquy with, “Let’s make some legislative his-
tory.”)  Anyone familiar with the congressional scene knows that one 
of the regular jobs of Washington law firms is to draft legislative 
history—to be read on the floor or inserted into committee reports. 
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 29, at 377 (footnotes omitted). 
Of course, many others disagreed with Scalia’s characterization of the draft-
ing and use of legislative history, particularly committee reports. See, e.g., Mikva, 
Reading and Writing Statutes, supra note 34, at 385; Wald, Sizzling Sleeper, supra 
note 28, at 306–07; KATZMANN, supra note 13, at 37–39 (stating that legislators 
themselves use legislative history, particularly committee reports, and that there 
are reasons for it to remain reliable); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, 
Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional 
Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 977 (2013) 
(finding that 59% of congressional staffers they surveyed singled out committee 
and conference reports as “as very reliable sources for legislators to consider” as 
well as the most reliable forms of legislative history); Statutory Interpretation and 
the Uses of Legislative History: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellec-
tual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
101st Cong. 21 (1990) (“[M]y understanding of most of the legislation I voted on 
[while a U.S. Senator] was based entirely on my reading of its language and, where 
necessary, on explanations contained in the [committee] report.”) (statement of 
Judge James L. Buckley). 
Some textualists, most prominently Judge Easterbrook, also argued that 
looking for legislative purpose or intent was a fool’s errand. See Frank H. Easter-
brook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 59, 65 (1988) (“The meaning of statutes is to be found not in the subjective, 
multiple mind of Congress but in the understanding of the objectively reasonable 
person.”).  Scalia, by contrast, disparaged the notion of subjective legislative in-
tent but invoked objective legislative purpose or intent as a valuable element of 
statutory construction. See, e.g., Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99–100 (1989) (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (“Except for the few passages to which I object, today’s opinion 
admirably follows our more recent approach of seeking to develop an interpreta-
tion of the statute that is reasonable, consistent, and faithful to its apparent 
purpose, rather than to achieve obedient adherence to cases cited in the commit-
tee reports.”); United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 447 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (“In 
the context of the entire statutory scheme, we think it displays a clear congres-
sional intent to deny the excluded employees the protections of [the statute].”); 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia J., dissenting) (“[W]hile it is 
possible to discern the objective ‘purpose’ of a statute (i.e., the public good at 
which its provisions appear to be directed), or even the formal motivation for a 
statute where that is explicitly set forth (as it was, to no avail, here), discerning the 
subjective motivation of those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always 
an impossible task.”); Karkkainen, supra note 29, at 410–19 (discussing the role 
of legislative intent and purpose in Scalia’s jurisprudence). 
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more generally was not ideological in design or likely result. 
They said their focus was on methodology, not results.40  That 
stated focus makes sense: methodology is absolutely essential 
to judging, so getting the methodology right in judicial opinions 
is of enormous importance. 
That said, as the discussion in the previous Part suggests, 
the advocacy for and embrace of textualism and against legisla-
tive history had an ideological element from the outset: Scalia 
was known as a particularly conservative judge (and then Jus-
tice), and most of the other prominent advocates were ideologi-
cal conservatives as well (Judges Alex Kozinski,  Frank 
Easterbrook, Kenneth Starr, etc.).41  Simply stated, the move-
ment against legislative history had a strong ideological skew. 
Why?  This goes beyond this Article and is speculative, but 
broadly speaking there are two obvious explanatory factors. 
First, it may be that, notwithstanding Scalia’s disavowals of a 
focus on outcomes, ideological conservatives in fact expected 
that textualism would be a means to achieve ideologically con-
servative statutory interpretations.  They may have expected 
that looking to purpose and legislative history would tend to 
broaden the scope of governmental authority and thus be more 
attractive to those who prefer broad regulatory authority, and 
that looking only to text would tend to do the opposite.  Those 
taking this position would acknowledge that there will be some 
cases in which legislative history will have the effect of narrow-
ing some seemingly broad statutory language, but expect that 
more often legislative history will show that Congress intended 
a broad sweep for its handiwork—and a broader sweep than 
40 See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 29, at 16. 
41 See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text; supra notes 32, 39; see 
also Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 373 (2005) (“[T]oday’s 
textualists tend to be politically conservative.”). The most prominent early excep-
tion was Democratic Judge and later Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. In 1987 she 
wrote an opinion following Scalia’s opinion in Hirschey, see Abourezk v. Reagan, 
785 F.2d 1043, 1054–55 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1986), but in her later years on the D.C. 
Circuit and during her time on the Supreme Court she regularly cited legislative 
history (and Scalia followed his practice of concurring in everything except for her 
invocation of legislative history). See, e.g., Fedway Assocs., Inc. v. U.S. Treasury, 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 976 F.2d 1416, 1421 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
(Ruth Bader Ginsburg, J.) (stating that “[t]he relevant legislative history strongly 
supports our reading of the plain meaning of the text” and then discussing the 
legislative history); W. Coast Sheet Metal, Inc. v. NLRB, 938 F.2d 1356, 1361 (D.C. 
Cir. 1991) (Ruth Bader Ginsburg, J.) (quoting at length from legislative history); 
Bank One Chi. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 273 (1996) (Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, J.) (relying on the drafting history of a statute as reflected in the 
House Report and the conference committee report); id. at 279 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (stating “I agree with the Court’s opinion, except that portion of it which 
enters into a discussion of ‘[t]he drafting history of § 4010.’”). 
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the bare words of the legislation might suggest.  Insofar as 
those were the expectations, it might lead to an ideological 
divide over legislative history and textualism versus 
purposivism.42 
Second, ideological conservatives might prefer the appar-
ently more rigorous methodology of textualism irrespective of 
any changes in ideological outcome that it might produce. 
Much of the criticism of the use of legislative history focused on 
the fact that judges could usually find something in the legisla-
tive history that supported almost any given statutory interpre-
tation and thus was far too empowering of judges.  The most 
42 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Spirit Killeth, But the Letter Giveth Life, 
NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13, 2012, at 18 (“[T]he textual originalist demands that the 
legislature think through myriad hypothetical scenarios and provide for all of 
them explicitly rather than rely on courts to be sensible.  In this way, textualism 
hobbles legislation—and thereby tilts toward ‘small government’ and away from 
‘big government,’ which in modern America is a conservative preference.”); Steven 
R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 62 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 37, 68 (1991) (“Barring judges from looking at the history of a statute and 
confining them strictly to its text means that the statute will only apply in those 
instances that Congress explicitly passes upon.  The scope of governmental regu-
lation is thereby constricted.”); Glen Staszewski, Textualism and the Executive 
Branch, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 143, 181 n.178 (2009) (“[T]he new textualism 
arguably makes it more difficult for Congress to achieve its underlying objectives 
because courts have a tendency to interpret the law in a relatively stingy fashion 
pursuant to this methodology.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme 
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 410 (1991) (arguing 
that formalism “embodies a relatively antigovernmental philosophy”); Andrei 
Marmor, The Immorality of Textualism, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2063, 2066 (2005) (“By 
advocating a theory of statutory interpretation that is preoccupied with literal 
meaning, and purportedly relies on bright-line rules or canons of statutory inter-
pretation, textualism strives to effectuate a broader ideological agenda that seeks 
to reduce the state and its regulatory functions to the necessary minimum.”).  In 
this regard, it may be relevant that between 1933 and 1994, Democrats controlled 
the House of Representatives for all but four years, and the Senate for all but ten 
years, whereas during that span Republicans occupied the White House for 28 
years.  Simply stated, until 1995 the lived experience of judges (and everyone else) 
was of largely Democratic control of the House and Senate but a more even 
balance with respect to the White House.  Insofar as invoking legislative history 
was understood to give additional weight and scope to members of the legislative 
majority (that is, in addition to what they had put in the legislative text), that 
would have meant giving additional weight to what had usually been Democratic 
majorities. See also infra note 106 and accompanying text. 
The view that textualism is ideologically conservative is by no means univer-
sal.  Maggie Lemos, for example, argues against it, noting that “whether a ‘stingy’ 
reading of statutes will appeal to political conservatives would seem to depend on 
the laws in question,” and contending that “a textualist reading is not necessarily 
more restrictive than a reading that is grounded on considerations of statutory 
purpose or evidence of legislative intent.”  Lemos, supra note 29, at 865–66, 869; 
see also Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods: A Positive Theory of 
Judges and Everyone Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 769, 815–19 (2008) (arguing that an 
association between political conservatism and textualism may be a result of 
judges’ self-selection bias). 
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famous line critical of the use of legislative history—one that 
Scalia himself invoked in one of his many separate opinions 
criticizing its use—was from Judge Harold Leventhal, a D.C. 
Circuit judge prominent in the 1970s, who said that “the use of 
legislative history [was] the equivalent of entering a crowded 
cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one’s 
friends.”43  The concern was that the use of legislative history 
provided judges with the ability to reach their favored statutory 
outcome.  Ideological conservatives, including not just judges 
and scholars but also politicians, frequently criticized judges 
for “legislating from the bench.”  This became a popular refrain 
among ideological conservatives in the 1980s.44  The idea was 
that judges were arrogating to themselves authority that was 
properly in the political branches.  The jurist who was most 
closely associated with this critique was Justice Scalia.  His 
position, and that of many other supporters of textualism and 
against the use of legislative history, was that their method-
ological approach limited judicial discretion and was concomi-
tantly preferable.45  This might have an ideological skew 
43 Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
Scalia introduced the Leventhal reference with the following language: 
The greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy.  We are 
governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators. . . .  But not 
the least of the defects of legislative history is its indeterminacy.  If 
one were to search for an interpretive technique that, on the whole, 
was more likely to confuse than to clarify, one could hardly find a 
more promising candidate than legislative history. 
Id. 
44 See, e.g., George H.W. Bush, Candidates State Positions on Federal Judicial 
Selection, 72 JUDICATURE 77 (1988) (“I am firmly committed to appointing judges 
who are dedicated to interpreting the law as it exists, rather than legislating from 
the bench.”); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION 
OF THE LAW 1 (1990): 
In law, the moment of temptation is the moment of choice, when a 
judge realizes that in the case before him his strongly held view of 
justice, his political and moral imperative, is not embodied in a 
statute or in any provision of the Constitution.  He must then 
choose between his version of justice and abiding by the American 
form of government.  Yet the desire to do justice, whose nature 
seems to him obvious, is compelling, while the concept of constitu-
tional process is abstract, rather arid, and the abstinence it coun-
sels unsatisfying.  To give in to temptation, this one time solves an 
urgent human problem, and a faint crack appears in the American 
foundation.  A judge has begun to rule where a legislator should. 
45 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1175, 1185 (1989) (“[W]hen one does not have a solid textual anchor . . . from 
which to derive the general rule, its pronouncement appears uncomfortably like 
legislation.”); SCALIA, supra note 1, at 35 (contending that courts’ use of legislative 
history “has facilitated rather than deterred decisions that are based upon the 
courts’ policy preferences, rather than neutral principles of law”); id. at 132 (“[T]he 
judge who uses ‘legislative intent or other interpretative methods’ does not en-
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insofar as ideological conservatives are likely to prefer that de-
cisions are made by democratically accountable deci-
sionmakers (a theme that also underlies arguments, again 
more likely to be embraced by ideological conservatives, for 
greater presidential control over the executive branch, and par-
ticularly independent agencies).46  Ignoring legislative history 
and relying solely on text might also appeal to those (again, 
prominently including Scalia himself) who preferred bright-line 
rules and categorical approaches to flexible or eclectic ap-
proaches that would allow for variations depending on the situ-
ation.47  Bright-line rules might appeal to jurists who are 
ideologically conservative, but that does not mean that there is 
a causal relationship.48 
Interestingly, and as suggested at the end of the previous 
Part, prominent ideologically liberal judges and commentators 
had sympathy for some aspects of this critique.  For instance, 
Scalia’s D.C. Circuit colleague Judge Patricia Wald also quoted 
with apparent disapproval the statement from Judge Leventhal 
tirely abandon text, but rather adds to whatever manipulability text contains the 
(much greater) manipulability of his extratextual methodology.  I concede, of 
course, that textualism is no ironclad protection against the judge who wishes to 
impose his will, but it is some protection.  The criterion of ‘legislative intent,’ by 
contrast, positively invites the judge to impose his will . . . it reduces him to 
guessing that the legislature intended what was most reasonable, which ordina-
rily coincides with what the judge himself thinks best.”); see also Herrmann v. 
Cencom Cable Assocs., Inc., 978 F.2d 978, 982 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.,) 
(stating that textualism “cuts down the amount of judicial discretion, for judges 
free to bend law to ‘intents’ that are invented more than they are discovered 
become the real authors of the rule”). 
46 Not coincidentally, Scalia was also the leading judicial voice for this “uni-
tary executive” theory, which posits that the President must be able to oversee all 
of the executive branch. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing at length for a unitary executive theory that would 
invalidate as unconstitutional a statute allowing for an independent counsel 
whom the President could not directly control and could not fire at will).  This 
theory, like textualism, gained particular prominence among ideological conserv-
atives during the Reagan Administration, though it was not limited to them. 
47 See Scalia, supra note 45, at 1176, 1184–85 (contrasting general rules of 
law with discretion to do justice and preferring the former, and using textualism 
as one example of the former). 
48 Maggie Lemos suggests a way in which these might be connected: 
Suppose that individuals who are drawn to political conservatism 
also tend to be drawn to relatively bright-line rules.  Suppose, fur-
ther, that while the two tendencies are correlated with each other, 
one does not cause the other; instead, the same psychological forces 
that lead individuals to rules also lead many of them to adopt politi-
cally conservative views.  If these suppositions were correct, they 
might provide a decidedly non-political explanation for the political 
patterns we observe in the adoption and rejection of textualism 
among judges and academics. 
Lemos, supra note 29, at 889–90 n.207 (citation omitted). 
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quoted above.49  She and other respondents to Scalia often 
argued against a practice of citing any legislative history that 
might be available.50  They did not defend notions like that in 
Overton Park that a court should look to text only if the legisla-
tive history was not clear.  On the contrary, they insisted that 
courts should begin with the statutory text and look to legisla-
tive history only to resolve textual ambiguities.51  But these 
ideologically liberal judges and commentators argued that rigor 
could be consistent with citing legislative history: courts 
should cite reliable legislative history like committee reports, 
whereas they should be very careful about citing the generally 
less reliable categories of floor debates and hearings.52 
49 See Wald, supra note 16, at 214 (“I am left with the sense, expressed by 
Justice Stevens in a dissent late last Term, that consistent and uniform rules for 
statutory construction and use of legislative materials are not being followed 
today. It sometimes seems that citing legislative history is still, as my late col-
league Harold Leventhal once observed, akin to ‘looking over a crowd and picking 
out your friends.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
50 See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
51 See Breyer, supra note 33, at 863 (“No one claims that legislative history is 
a statute, or even that, in any strong sense, it is ‘law.’  Rather, legislative history is 
helpful in trying to understand the meaning of the words that do make up the 
statute or the ‘law.’  A judge cannot interpret the words of an ambiguous statute 
without looking beyond its words for the words have simply ceased to provide 
univocal guidance to decide the case at hand.”). 
52 Judge Mikva brought these points together and is worth quoting at length: 
If the [statute’s] words are capable of a clear meaning that can be 
applied to the case at hand, we ought to look no further.  As Judge 
Leventhal said, one can always find some friends in the legislative 
history.  Judges ought not tilt the result by looking unnecessarily. 
Unfortunately, the plain meaning doctrine does not answer many of 
the interpretation disputes that judges are called upon to resolve. 
For many reasons, including original sin, legislators do not always 
speak plainly, and certainly not comprehensively.  There will be nu-
merous occasions in which the judges must look to the legislative 
history to decide the cases before them. 
. . . .  Seldom is the floor debate the vehicle by which the legisla-
tive branch resolves its wording disputes. Those arguments are 
much more likely to be resolved in committee and reflected in the 
committee report.  Nevertheless, some judges think that the com-
mittee report is “unreliable” because it is written by staff rather than 
by Members of Congress.  Other judges do not think about the com-
mittee report at all.  I think it ought to be the first place that judges 
look to find out what Congress meant.  The enemy is not legislative 
records—only bad legislative records. 
. . . .  Legislators will frequently use the easy access to the 
Congressional Record as a device to confuse the plain meaning of a 
statute. Judges will frequently get gulled by this device. 
Abner J. Mikva, Statutory Interpretation: Getting the Law to Be Less Common, 50 
OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 981–82 (1989); see also Wald, Sizzling Sleeper, supra note 28, 
at 306–07 (“To disregard committee reports as indicators of congressional under-
standing because we are suspicious that nefarious staffers have planted certain 
information for some undisclosed reason, is to second-guess Congress’ chosen 
form of organization and delegation of authority, and to doubt its ability to oversee 
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B. The Implications for Judicial Behavior 
Insofar as ideologically conservative judges’ embrace of tex-
tualism, and concomitant dismissal of legislative history, re-
flected a desire to achieve ideologically conservative case 
outcomes, and insofar as methodology imposes some con-
straint, one might expect to see an increase in conservative 
outcomes for judges who abjured reliance on legislative history. 
If methodology imposes no constraint, then presumably judges 
would reach the same outcomes whether or not they used legis-
lative history. 
Other scholars have looked at case outcomes to see what 
role the use of legislative history has played.  In a study of 320 
opinions on labor-employer relations by eight liberal Supreme 
Court Justices from the 1969 to 2006 terms, Brudney and 
Ditslear concluded that when liberal Justices cite legislative 
history materials in their reasoning, they often do so to justify a 
higher proportion of their pro-employer outcomes than their 
pro-employee decisions.53  Benesh and Czarnezki studied all 
nonunanimous decisions issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit from the 1997 term through the 2003 
term in the legal areas of criminal procedure, civil rights, First 
Amendment, due process, and privacy.54  After controlling for 
the ideology of the judges and identifying whether a case was 
resolved in a liberal or conservative ideological direction, the 
authors did not observe a statistically significant relationship 
between a judge’s career usage of legislative history and the 
likelihood a judge will vote conservatively.55 
its own constitutional functions effectively.  It comes perilously close, in my view, 
to impugning the way a coordinate branch conducts its operations and, in that 
sense, runs the risk of violating the spirit if not the letter of the separation of 
powers principle.”); Wald, supra note 16, at 201 (“Committee reports indeed re-
main the most widely accepted indicators of Congress’ intent.”); Farber & Frickey, 
supra note 20, at 448  (“American public law has quite properly recognized that 
statutory meaning is necessarily greatly influenced by statutory context.  Legisla-
tive history is part of that context, and some aspects of it—such as committee 
reports—will frequently represent the most intelligent exposition available of what 
the statute is all about.” (footnote omitted)); James J. Brudney, Congressional 
Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Re-
sponse?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 41–56 (1994) (considering and rejecting constitu-
tional and practical arguments for disregarding or devaluing legislative history, 
especially committee reports). 
53 See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 24, at 125–28 (presenting evidence 
against the view that legislative history is invoked opportunistically by federal 
judges). 
54 Sara C. Benesh & Jason J. Czarnezki, The Ideology of Legal Interpretation, 
29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 113, 124–25 (2009) (suggesting that legislative history is 
invoked opportunistically by federal judges). 
55 Id. at 130–31. 
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Focusing on outcomes is useful, but it relies on contestable 
(and contested) ideological coding of how conservative or liberal 
a given decision is.56  In this Article, we ask a more parsimoni-
ous question that focuses on citations to legislative history. 
Those advocating for textualism and attacking the use of legis-
lative history argued that judges were making a methodological 
mistake insofar as they cited legislative history, and they urged 
that judges refrain from doing so.  That is, the central method-
ological implication of this focus on text is that courts should 
not look to legislative history in construing statutes.  Legisla-
tive history was irrelevant to the proper interpretation of stat-
utes, and courts should avoid citing it.  Thus Scalia frequently 
joined a majority opinion in all respects except the portion of it 
that cited legislative history.  This makes for a straightforward 
analysis of judicial citation behavior: the more judges cite legis-
56 For arguments against the reliability of coding, see Hon. Harry T. Edwards 
& Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt to Understand 
the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1925 (2009): 
[I]t is very difficult to characterize many case outcomes.  For exam-
ple, the general rights embraced by freedom of religion and freedom 
of expression sometimes conflict with the exercise of other rights; it 
may not be clear how presumed liberal or conservative judges 
should be expected to vote in such cases.  Cases may be disposed of 
on procedural grounds that are essentially nonideological, leading 
to coding errors when the outcome must be coded as liberal or 
conservative.  A court’s interpretation of a statute may defy ideologi-
cal description (e.g., rate allocations in a matter before the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, where the parties before the court 
are competing companies). . . . [M]any appeals involve multiple, 
complex issues, thus making it impossible to describe the appellate 
court’s disposition as liberal or conservative. 
See also Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical Analy-
sis of the Supreme Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 480–81 (2009) (“[R]ather than 
illuminate the workings of the Supreme Court, some empirical findings may re-
flect the way the [Supreme Court Judicial] Database reports [or codes] informa-
tion.”); Anna Harvey & Michael J. Woodruff, Confirmation Bias in the United States 
Supreme Court Judicial Database, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 414, 415–21 (2013) (find-
ing, as the title suggests, confirmation bias in the Supreme Court Judicial 
Database); Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Fed-
eralist Revival After Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 11–14 (arguing that 
ideological coding of case outcomes is fraught with difficulties, and that “the 
different factors used to code a case as ‘conservative’ or ‘liberal’ may cut in differ-
ent directions within the confines of a single case”). 
For arguments in favor of the reliability of coding, see, e.g., Tonja Jacobi & 
Matthew Sag, Taking the Measure of Ideology: Empirically Measuring Supreme 
Court Cases, 98 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1, 8 n.30 (2009) (defending the ideological 
coding of cases in the Supreme Court Judicial Database); Tracey E. George, 
Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO 
STATE L.J. 1635, 1673 n.129 (1998) (arguing in favor of ideological coding). 
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lative history in their majority opinions, the less they are fol-
lowing Scalia.57 
Others have looked at citation patterns generally.  One 
strand of this research focuses on how much influence Justice 
Scalia’s crusade against legislative history and concomitant 
embrace of textualist statutory interpretation had over the Su-
preme Court.58  Koby studied opinions by the Court from the 
time Scalia was nominated in 1986 to 1998, finding an overall 
decline in citations to committee reports, congressional de-
bates, and committee hearings in Supreme Court opinions dur-
ing this period.59  Mikva and Lane concluded that little has 
changed in the way courts interpret statutes, and argue that 
because the Supreme Court, lower federal courts, and state 
courts of last resort continue to use legislative history materi-
als to interpret statutes, textualism did not have deep and 
persistent effects.60 
57 Judges frequently cite legislative history (and other relevant legal materials 
like enacted statutes and prior opinions) and then conclude that the cited mate-
rial is not dispositive in that case.  In such a situation, the judge is treating the 
category of legislative history as relevant but finding that this particular legislative 
history does not help to resolve the case.  That is in tension with Justice Scalia’s 
repeated admonitions to avoid citing legislative history in the first place.  Scalia 
pithily summarized his long-held views on citing legislative history in a 1996 case: 
“The text’s the thing.  We should therefore ignore drafting history without discuss-
ing it, instead of after discussing it.”  Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & 
Tr. Co., 516 U.S. 264, 283 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring).  It is also possible that a 
judge might cite legislative history but also indicate that all legislative history is 
irrelevant.  Again, in doing so, the judge would not be adopting Scalia’s position 
(and his frequent practice in joining all of a majority opinion except for its discus-
sion of legislative history) that judges should generally ignore legislative history in 
the first place.  And in our review of cases for this Article, we found a range of 
reliance on legislative history (some opinions relied on it, some treated it as useful 
but not dispositive, some treated it as relevant but not adding much, etc.), but no 
opinions that cited legislative history only to state all that all legislative history is 
irrelevant.  That said, we cannot rule out the possibility that on some occasions 
judges so stated, although we have no reason to believe that such a possibility 
changes our results. 
58 See Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the 
Supreme Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205, 212–21 (2000). 
59 See Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on Legislative 
History: The Impact of Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. LEGIS. 369, 384–87 
(1999); see also Siegel, supra note 26, at 401–13 (finding that briefs filed in the 
Supreme Court continued to cite legislative history, perhaps reflecting the fact 
that Scalia never achieved a majority on the Supreme Court for his complete 
rejection of legislative history and thus counsel wanted to cite legislative history in 
the hope of persuading those who looked to it). 
60 See Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, The Muzak of Justice Scalia’s Revolution-
ary Call to Read Unclear Statutes Narrowly, 53 SMU L. REV. 121, 121–23 (2000) 
(discussing that Scalia’s crusade against legislative history materials in statutory 
interpretation had more profound effect on scholars than judges). 
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A second relevant strand of research focuses on the impact 
of Scalia’s campaign against the use of legislative history on 
federal appellate courts.  Bruhl uncovered evidence that courts 
of appeals adopt patterns of statutory interpretation from the 
Supreme Court.61  Similarly, Cross argued that lower federal 
courts may take statutory interpretation cues from the Su-
preme Court and adapt their own interpretive methods accord-
ingly.62  A number of research projects have found evidence 
that lower courts absorb and implement the Supreme Court’s 
patterns of statutory interpretation.63  Notably, Bridgman ex-
plored all citations to legislative history materials in published 
federal appellate opinions from 1950 to 2006.64  By analyzing 
overall citation rates and the rate at which certain types of 
legislative materials are cited, he found that during the 1970s 
and 1980s the D.C. Circuit’s use of legislative materials 
tracked the Supreme Court more closely than the other cir-
cuits.65  Bridgman found that the disparity between the D.C. 
Circuit and the other circuits cannot be fully accounted for by 
the D.C. Circuit handling more statutory interpretation cases 
or writing longer opinions.66  Cross counted the number of 
opinions published by federal appellate courts each year that 
contain a reference to “legislative history,” “Conference Com-
mittee,” Westlaw Keynumbers associated with textualism, and 
Westlaw Keynumbers associated with pragmatism.67  Among 
many notable findings, Cross observed a steady decline in the 
rate federal courts of appeals refer to “legislative history” in the 
late 1980s.68  Brudney and Baum, focusing on Supreme Court 
61 See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Communicating the Canons: How Lower 
Courts React When the Supreme Court Changes the Rules of Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 100 MINN. L. REV. 481, 483, 540–41 (2015). 
62 See FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
187–89 (2008) (counting the number of opinions published by each courts of 
appeals each year that contain a reference to “legislative history,” “Conference 
Committee,” along with the Westlaw Keynumbers associated with textualism, and 
the Westlaw Keynumbers associated with pragmatism). 
63 See Bridgman, supra note 15, at 1 (studying patterns of citations to legisla-
tive history in courts of appeals from 1950 to 2006); see also Bruhl, supra note 61, 
at 491–93 (discussing the large scale trends of statutory interpretation methods 
in lower federal courts and identifying these trends as evidence that a movement 
towards a more formal system of stare decisis for statutory interpretation is possi-
ble); Fritz Snyder, Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme 
Court and the Tenth Circuit, 49 OKLA. L. REV. 573, 573–89 (1996) (noting patterns 
of statutory interpretation between the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit). 
64 See Bridgman, supra note 15, at 12–14. 
65 Id. at 25–26. 
66 Id. at 31–32, 35–36. 
67 CROSS, supra note 62, at 184. 
68 See id. at 187. 
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and appellate court decisions from 2005 to 2015, found that 
the Supreme Court has been far more likely to cite legislative 
history than the Courts of Appeals.69  In separate papers using 
different datasets, both Bruhl and Brudney/Baum considered 
appellate cases reviewed by the Supreme Court (so the same 
case produces an appellate and a Supreme Court opinion) and 
found that even when the Supreme Court and the appellate 
court cite legislative history, they often invoke different legisla-
tive history materials.70  Among their conclusions was that fed-
eral appellate courts do not treat Supreme Court opinions as 
creating methodological stare decisis with respect to legislative 
history (or other interpretive resources). 
Other scholars have explored some impacts of ideology on 
judges’ use of legislative history.  Abramowicz and Tiller found 
that federal district court judges were modestly influenced by 
the ideological composition of the appellate court above them 
and of their colleagues.71  Law and Zaring evaluated ideology 
and statutory interpretation with regard to the Supreme Court, 
finding that Justices are more likely to consult legislative his-
tory materials when they are ideologically aligned with the po-
litical party that enacted the statute they are interpreting.72 
In this Article we examine citations to legislative history in 
light of judicial political party.  As the discussion above sug-
gests, we hypothesize that the attacks on the judicial use of 
legislative history would have more traction with ideologically 
conservative judges than ideologically liberal judges.73  The 
most straightforward measure of ideology is political party, and 
in particular the political party of the most recent President to 
69 James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Protean Statutory Interpretation in 
the Courts of Appeals, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 681, 707–22 (2017). 
70 James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Two Roads Diverged: Statutory Inter-
pretation by the Supreme Court and the Circuit Courts in the Same Cases, 88 
FORDHAM L. REV. 823, 837–63 (2019); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Statutory Interpre-
tation and the Rest of the Iceberg: Divergences Between the Lower Federal Courts 
and the Supreme Court, 68 DUKE L.J. 1, 50 (2018). 
71 See Michael Abramowicz & Emerson H. Tiller, Citation to Legislative His-
tory: Empirical Evidence on Positive Political and Contextual Theories of Judicial 
Decision Making, 38 J. LEGAL  STUD. 419, 419 (2009) (noting that an authoring 
judge will have a greater tendency to cite legislative history by legislators who 
share political party affiliation with the colleagues and superiors of the authoring 
judge than legislators sharing the same political party affiliation as the authoring 
judge himself). 
72 See David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court 
and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653, 1726 (2009). 
73 One way of conceptualizing this point is that those more likely to be af-
fected by Scalia’s attacks will, at the margin, be less likely to cite legislative 
history.  And the bigger the impact, the bigger the margin.  The more they are 
influenced, the more dubious they will be about citing legislative history. 
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nominate a given judge.74  We thus expect that, in the federal 
appellate courts, there was a difference between how Demo-
cratic and Republican judges responded to the attacks on legis-
lative history in their citation practices.  Specifically, we 
hypothesize that Republican circuit judges would have a 
stronger reaction to the attacks on legislative history. 
Justice Scalia’s message was straightforward: legislative 
history is irrelevant to statutory interpretation and thus judges 
should generally ignore it.  This yields an expectation: the more 
fully judges adopt Scalia’s position, the more likely they will be 
to ignore legislative history relative to those who do not adopt 
his position.  Correspondingly, the more judges cite legislative 
history, the less they are following Scalia’s lead, because they 
are citing what he considers to be irrelevant materials.  Citation 
counts have obvious limitations: we have only the bare fact of 
citation, without additional information about exactly how 
much weight a judge put on the cited source.  But in this case 
bare citations are significant, because they are inconsistent 
with Scalia’s general position.  A citation to legislative history in 
a given opinion suggests that the author has rejected Scalia’s 
methodological position on legislative history.75 
We focus on the author of the majority opinion because the 
opinion author is likely to have the predominant influence on 
the prose of her opinion and the citations within it.76  Studies 
have shown that circuit judges bargain over case outcomes, 
but there is no clear empirical evidence that this bargaining 
extends to the citations within those opinions.77 
74 See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States 
Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
1319, 1327 (2009) (noting the party of the most recent President to nominate a 
judge is the standard practice for identifying the ideology of a judge; the last 
President had the most information and circuit judgeships are more politically 
salient and sensitive than district court judgeships); CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE 
JUDGES  POLITICAL?: AN  EMPIRICAL  ANALYSIS OF THE  FEDERAL  JUDICIARY 5–7 (2006) 
(using the President’s party as the measure of judicial ideology); Adam B. Cox & 
Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008) 
(same); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Cir-
cuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1718–19 (1997) (same). 
75 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
76 See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 95–107 
(1997) (noting that the author of the majority opinion has the greatest impact on 
the content within an opinion). 
77 See, e.g., Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs, II & Forrest Maltzman, 
Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and Accommodation on the United States Su-
preme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294, 311–13 (1998) (examining the extent of 
accommodation in Supreme Court majority opinions by studying the draft opin-
ions circulated by the majority opinion author); see also Sean Farhang & Gregory 
Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representa-
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This leads to our first hypothesis: after the launching of the 
attacks on judicial use of legislative history, circuit judges ap-
pointed by Republican Presidents would be significantly less 
likely to cite all forms of legislative history than their Demo-
cratic counterparts. 
Our second hypothesis involves the diffusion of ideas.  Max 
Planck famously said that “[a] new scientific truth does not 
triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the 
light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a 
new generation grows up that is familiar with it.”78  The broad 
point is that ideas that change the intellectual terrain are likely 
to have a bigger impact on those who come of age after the 
diffusion of the idea than on their predecessors.  One arguable 
example in law is law and economics.  Commentators have 
noted that law and economics had particular impact on law-
yers, regulators, and professors who came of age after its rise 
had begun.79  Simply stated, some movements shift the terms 
of the debate going forward, with a greater influence on those 
whose intellectual development occurs during or after the 
debate. 
Judges appointed before the 1980s joined the bench, and 
thus began interpreting statutes and deciding what, if any, 
tion Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299, 321 (2004) (finding 
that gender and ideological composition of federal appellate panels influences 
whether panelists vote to reverse or affirm); Sheldon Goldman, Conflict and Con-
sensus in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1968 WIS. L. REV. 461, 481  (argu-
ing that bloc voting occurred on most federal appellate courts). 
78 MAX PLANCK, SCIENTIFIC AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND OTHER PAPERS 33–34 (Frank Gay-
nor trans., 1949); see also THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 
174–210 (3d ed. 1996).  Paul Samuelson shortened Planck’s statement to the 
pithier “science makes progress funeral by funeral,” adding: “the old are never 
converted by the new doctrines, they simply are replaced by a new generation.” 
See Science Makes Progress Funeral by Funeral, QUOTE  INVESTIGATOR (Sept. 25, 
2017), https://quoteinvestigator.com/2017/09/25/progress/ [https://perma.cc 
/AVD3-CP5S]. 
79 See, e.g., Ugo Mattei, Efficiency as Equity: Insights from Comparative Law 
and Economics, 18 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 157, 171 (1994) (“In the United 
States, law and economics is already deeply influencing the methods of reasoning 
of a new generation of lawyers, and its impact on the applied law is already a 
reality.”); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental 
Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 36 (1991) (“As the 
bureaucracy has grown more aware of the reasoning behind market-based ap-
proaches, it has responded to them more favorably.  Younger staff members in 
particular have been influenced by the growth over the past decade of the ‘law and 
economics’ movement within major law schools and the proliferation of profes-
sional schools of public policy.”); Bryan D. Lammon, What We Talk About When 
We Talk About Ideology: Judicial Politics Scholarship and Naive Legal Realism, 83 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 231, 232 n.1 (2009) (“[L]aw and economics provided a tangible 
theory of human behavior that would influence a generation of legal thought.”). 
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sorts of legislative history to rely on, before the attacks began. 
For those who became judges in the Reagan Administration 
and thereafter, by contrast, the attacks on legislative history 
occurred early in their judicial careers or before they ever 
started.  There is some evidence that these later-appointed 
judges were more influenced by Scalia’s attacks on legislative 
history than were their earlier-appointed counterparts.  Gluck 
and Posner interviewed forty-two federal appellate judges and 
found generational differences.  Notably, in contrast to older 
judges, they “heard Justice Scalia’s and textualism’s influences 
emphasized by younger judges of all political backgrounds.”80 
This dovetails with dozens of conversations one of the authors 
has had with judges and law professors who came of age before 
and after Scalia launched his attacks. 
We expect that later judges would be more impacted by the 
arguments against legislative history than those who had been 
engaging in statutory interpretation well before Scalia started 
his attacks.  And we would expect this effect would extend to 
Democratic judges appointed after the Reagan Administration, 
as Scalia’s attacks may have led lawyers of all political stripes 
to examine their approach to legislative history.  So we hypoth-
esize that judges appointed by Reagan and later Presidents 
were more influenced by the attacks on legislative history than 
were their earlier-appointed counterparts.  This leads to our 
second hypothesis: after the launching of the attacks on judi-
cial use of legislative history, circuit judges appointed by Rea-
gan or later Presidents would be significantly less likely to cite 
all forms of legislative history than circuit judges appointed by 
earlier Presidents. 
Our two hypotheses are independent of each other, so we 
expect that each will operate independently, with the result 
that post-Reagan Republican judges would be most affected by 
the attacks on legislative history.  That is, we hypothesize that 
the post-Reagan effect interacts with judges’ political party 
such that the post-Reagan effect would be greater among Re-
publican cohorts than among Democratic cohorts. 
80 See Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the 
Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. 
L. REV. 1298, 1312 (2018).  Gluck and Lisa Bressman similarly suggest that there 
may be a generational effect on legislative drafters’ awareness of judicial canons of 
interpretation. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 39, at 1022 (discussing the 
“possibility that drafter awareness of the canons is generational and is changing 
across time”). 
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III 
DATA AND MEASURES 
We test our hypotheses by analyzing a dataset made up of 
all published federal appellate court majority opinions between 
1965 and 2011, totaling 240,933 opinions.  The opinions we 
use are from the Jonathan Mayer Advancing Empirical Legal 
Scholarship data repository of published opinions (Mayer 
Opinions).81  We developed a Python script that parsed each 
opinion and drew out information on the circuit, the author of 
the majority opinion, citations within the majority opinion, and 
publication date.  We matched the authoring judge with bio-
graphical information from the Federal Judicial Center con-
taining the name and party of the President who most recently 
nominated the judge and the date of the judge’s first commis-
sion to the federal judiciary.  As we noted above, we use the 
political party of the President who most recently nominated 
the circuit judge as the measure of political party.82 
Next, we identified instances of citations to legislative his-
tory materials.  Some types of legislative history materials took 
on a variety of citation formats.  For example, in order to find all 
citations to committee reports, including conference reports, 
our searches included all iterations of “Conf. Rep.,” “H.R. Rep.,” 
and “S. Rep.”  We included all citation formats of which we were 
aware, including formats from the Legal Bluebook as well as 
nonstandard citation formats.83  So, for example, we searched 
81 See Jonathan Mayer, Advancing Empirical Legal Scholarship: Federal Ap-
pellate Opinions and Rules, WEB POL’Y (May 3, 2013), http://webpolicy.org/2013/ 
05/03/advancing-empirical-legal-scholarship-federal-appellate-opinions-and-
rules/ [https://perma.cc/N68V-A5NG].  We created two samples of majority opin-
ions from the Mayer Opinions and compared them with opinion data from the 
Caselaw Access Project. Project: Caselaw Access Project, LIBR. INNOVATION  LAB 
(2019), https://case.law [https://perma.cc/22B9-ME94].  The first sample con-
tained opinions with known citations to legislative history materials and the sec-
ond sample contained opinions that did not include citations to legislative history 
materials.  We found that the opinions and their citations (or lack thereof) 
matched with opinion data from the Caselaw Access Project.  Moreover, the num-
ber of published opinions for each appellate court in our time period of interest 
matched up with opinion data provided by the Caselaw Access Project. 
82 See supra note 74. 
83 See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION, https://www.legalblue-
book.com/ [https://perma.cc/XF3N-85K4] (last visited Feb. 10, 2020). We 
searched for every standard and nonstandard citation form that we observed in 
any opinion.  But given the many conceivable nonstandard citation formats, we 
cannot be completely confident we have captured the entire universe of citations 
to legislative history materials in our data.  That said, we are confident that we 
have captured all citations when standard and obvious nonstandard citation 
formats have been used.  Further, we investigated the frequency of nonstandard 
formats and found that there is no clear circuit-level or judge-level source driving 
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both for “Cong. Rec.” (the Bluebook citation form for the Con-
gressional Record) as well as nonstandard citation formats 
such as “Cong. Record” and “Congressional Rec.”84  We also 
included as a comparator two compendiums of duly enacted or 
promulgated federal laws—the United States Code and the 
Code of Federal Regulations.  These two sources are of course 
quite different from legislative history materials, as they are the 
enacted legislation or promulgated regulations.  Thus there 
were four basic sources in total: statements made in House and 
Senate floor debates or in House and Senate committee hear-
ings; House and Senate committee reports (including confer-
ence reports); the Code of Federal Regulations; and the United 
States Code.85 
We utilized the advance search tool within Lexis Advance 
in order to validate our data on citations to legislative history 
materials in courts of appeals majority opinions.86  These 
this type of citation behavior.  Instead, the source of these nonstandard citation 
formats appears to be clerk-level effects, as a judge’s opinions may contain these 
nonstandard citations in one term but not contain them in the following term. 
84 There are many advantages for implementing an automated analysis of 
majority opinions.  First, a machine can efficiently analyze far more content than 
would be feasible through a hand-coding or manual analysis.  (The most extensive 
hand-coding study conducted so far for opinions by federal appellate courts is the 
United States Court of Appeals Database, JUD. RES. INITIATIVE, https://artsand-
sciences.sc.edu/poli/juri/appct.htm [https://perma.cc/XY8X-ECF6] (last visited 
Feb 10, 2020), which manually analyzed 18,000 opinions published by the federal 
courts of appeals between 1925 and 2002.)  Second, our automation avoids selec-
tion bias because it canvasses the entire universe of published opinions within 
our selected time range, rather than a possibly unrepresentative sample of opin-
ions.  Finally, machines are not prone to unconscious biases that exist within 
human researchers.  Even with procedures, codebooks, and intercoder reliability 
checks, data coded by humans will always be prone to human error.  The general 
disadvantage of our automated technique is that the process is limited to the 
parameters we specify.  In other words, if we fail to specify a specific citation 
format, those citations will not be identified. 
85 Other types of legislative materials, such as concurrent and joint resolu-
tions, were also identified and validated.  Given the infrequent use of these materi-
als in opinions by courts of appeals, we ultimately decided to omit these types of 
materials from our study. 
Statements in floor debates are cited ten times more often than statements in 
committee hearings.  We combined them into a single category because when 
courts and commentators have discussed hearing statements, they have treated 
them as similar to floor debates in their unreliability. See, e.g., S & E Contractors, 
Inc. v United States, 406 U.S. 1, 13 n.9 (1972) (“[W]e have been extremely wary of 
testimony before committee hearings and of debates on the floor of Congress.”); 
supra note 13.  As a robustness check, we calculated all the results presented in 
this Article for floor statements and committee statements separately, and all the 
substantive results were the same. 
Citations to the Congressional Globe are included in the Floor Debate or 
Committee Hearing category of legislative history materials. See supra note 12. 
86 We also performed a second internal validation test to check across time 
and circuits for extreme jumps and drops in the citation patterns.  This process 
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searches rely on a string-matching pattern to identify whether 
an opinion contains a citation to a legislative history material 
or not.  If our searches in Lexis Advance revealed a number of 
opinions citing a given legislative history material that is 
smaller or larger than the number we gleaned from Mayer 
Opinions, it would suggest that our search terms failed to ac-
curately capture citations to legislative history materials. 
Within Lexis Advance, we limited our searches to reported 
opinions by federal courts of appeals and limited the range of 
publication dates from January 1, 1965 to December 31, 2011. 
The results by Lexis Advance yielded the same number of re-
ported opinions as found when searching within Mayer Opin-
ions, thus validating our data and the reliability of our method 
for identifying citations to legislative materials within opinions. 
We perform our analyses at the opinion level: this allows us 
to determine whether, in a given majority opinion, there are 
any citations to the relevant materials.  We believe this is the 
appropriate measure for two reasons.  First, Justice Scalia’s 
clear admonition was against citing legislative history, so the 
key line is between citation and noncitation.87  Second, focus-
ing on citation versus noncitation prevents the analysis being 
skewed by a few opinions that contain a very large number of 
citations to the relevant materials. 
Table 1 depicts the distribution of majority opinions that 
cite different types of materials along with the string-matching 
searches used to identify the citations.  Table 1 also identifies 
what percent of the opinions that cite a specific type of legisla-
tive history were authored by a Republican judge.88 
observed if there was a 20% increase (or decrease) in the number of opinions 
citing legislative materials as compared to the previous year.  We did this for each 
type of legislative material that had more than 300 opinions citing the given type 
(omitting Senate concurrent resolutions, House concurrent resolutions, Senate 
joint resolutions, House joint resolutions, Senate documents, and House docu-
ments).  The results of this internal validation indicate that there was no sudden 
and inexplicable drop (or rise) in the number of opinions citing a type of legislative 
material. 
87 See supra note 57. 
88 The searches implemented in Lexis Advance are not impacted by the punc-
tuation found within the “Search Term(s)” column for Table 1.  For example, “S. 
Rep.” is akin to “S Rep” in the search.  However, with regard to the regular 
expressions used within the text of opinions, punctuation does matter.  For this 
reason, the regular expression analysis includes both “S. Rep.” and “S Rep.” 
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TABLE 1: SEARCHES OF MATERIALS IN REPORTED MAJORITY 
OPINIONS (1965–2011) 
Type of Legislative 
History Material Search Term(s) 
Number of 
Opinions* 
% Authored by 
Republican Judge 
Floor Debate or 
Committee Hearing 
“cong. rec” OR “congressional rec” OR 
“cong. record” OR “cong. globe” OR 
“statement of rep” OR “statement by 
Rep” OR “statement of sen” OR “state-
ment by sen” OR “statement of chair” 
OR “statement by chair” OR “statement 
of hon” OR “statement by hon” OR 
“statement of representative” OR “state-
ment by representative” OR “statement 
of senator” OR “statement by senator” 
OR “statement of honorable” OR “state-
ment by honorable” OR “remarks of 
rep” OR “remarks by Rep” OR “remarks 
of sen” OR “remarks by sen” OR “re-
marks of chair” OR “remarks by chair” 
OR “remarks of hon” OR “remarks by 
hon” OR “remarks of representative” 
OR “remarks by representative” OR “re-
marks of senator” OR “remarks by sen-
ator” OR “remarks of honorable” OR 
“remarks by honorable” OR “comments 
of rep” OR “comments by Rep” OR 
“comments of sen” OR “comments by 
sen” OR “comments of chair” OR “com-
ments by chair” OR “comments of hon” 
OR “comments by hon” OR “comments 
of representative” OR “comments by 
representative” OR “comments of sena-
tor” OR “comments by senator” OR 
“comments of honorable” OR “com-
ments by honorable” OR “hearing 
before the committee” OR “hearing 
before the comm” OR “hearing before 
the subcommittee” OR “hearing before 
the subcomm” OR “hearing on h.r” OR 
“hearing on s.” OR “hearing before the 
h” OR “comm. hearing” OR “hearing 
before the s” OR “comm. hearing” 
7,803 37.29% 
Committee Report “conf. rep” OR “conf. report” OR “h.r. 
rep” OR “s. rep” OR “s.report” OR “h. 
rep” OR “h.rep” OR “conference rep” OR 
“senate rep” OR “house rep” OR “h.r. 
report” OR “s. report” OR “h. r. report” 
OR “h. r. report” OR “committee report” 
OR “committee rep” OR “comm. rep” 
OR “comm. report” OR “subcommittee 
rep” OR “subcommittee report” OR 
“subcomm. rep.” OR “subcomm. report” 
30,215 56.36% 
Code of Federal 
Regulations 
“C.F.R.” 41,749 50.84% 
U.S. Code “U.S.C.” 231,212 49.75% 
*Number of majority opinions validated by Lexis Advance and with the aid of research 
assistants. 
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Table 1 presents aggregate data concerning the frequency 
of citations to legislative materials in majority opinions.89  In 
the next section we disaggregate the statistics from Table 1 to 
observe more specific citation patterns by Democratic and Re-
publican judges across time.  We also employ a series of empiri-
cal approaches to test our hypotheses. 
IV 
RESULTS 
First, we disaggregate the data and depict the frequency at 
which each type of legislative history material is cited by Re-
publican and Democratic appellate judges for each year in our 
analysis.90  In each figure the x-axis represents the year the 
opinions were published, the y-axis represents a count of the 
89 We performed several samples of our results for citations to committee 
reports (including conference reports) and committee hearings and found that 
they accurately reflected citations to the relevant materials.  The Congressional 
Record, however, created a special challenge because of its mixed contents: the 
Congressional Record contains House and Senate floor proceedings, transcripts of 
floor debate and remarks, notice of all bills introduced, the text of bills (as passed 
by a chamber, but usually not when introduced), full text of all conference com-
mittee reports, notices of committee and presidential actions and communica-
tions, and statements or documents submitted by members of Congress for 
publication.  Richard J. McKinney, An Overview of the Congressional Record and 
Its Predecessor Publications: A Research Guide, LAW LIBR.’S SOC’Y WASH., D.C., (last 
updated May 2019), https://www.llsdc.org/congressional-record-overview 
[https://perma.cc/T6SH-7HNQ].  In addition, some materials from floor debates 
are actually committee or conference reports or portions thereof (often section-by-
section analyses produced by the relevant committee) that are inserted in the 
record.  With the help of two excellent research librarians, we reviewed all 457 
majority opinions that referred to a conference report within 100 words of a 
citation to the Congressional Record, in order to determine whether a given opin-
ion cited both a conference report and a floor debate or instead cited a conference 
report that was published in the Congressional Record.  And, with the help of two 
excellent research assistants, we reviewed each majority opinion that was identi-
fied in our textual analysis as containing a citation to the Congressional Record, 
in the standard Bluebook format or not (using the search terms identified in Table 
1).  This examination yielded a total of 7,803 majority opinions citing the Congres-
sional Record.  Our research assistants reviewed each of these majority opinions 
to determine if it cited a statement from a floor debate (that is, a statement or 
remark by a Senator or Representative, not including the portions of such state-
ments or remarks that were committee or conference reports or portions thereof). 
The research assistants agreed on more than 99% of the cases that they both 
coded, and we agreed with the coding of each research assistant in more than 
99% of the cases. 
90 The number of cases resolved by the courts of appeals each year generally 
increases over the course of our study. See Statistics & Reports, U.S. COURTS, 
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports [https://perma.cc/8M85-LPW7] 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2020).  We did not see a systematic increase in the cases that 
are most likely to involve statutory interpretation (such as administrative law 
cases).  In any event, any increase in caseload (or particular kinds of cases) could 
not explain our results on differing citation propensities. 
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number of opinions that cite a given legislative history mate-
rial, and the legend identifies Republican (black line) and Dem-
ocratic (grey line) appellate judges.91 
FIGURE 1: NUMBER OF MAJORITY OPINIONS CITING MATERIALS BY 
PARTISANSHIP (1995–2011) 
Opinions Citing Floor Debates or Committee Hearings 
(1965–2011) 
Opinions Citing Committee Reports (1965–2011) 
91 So the y-axis in Figure 1 reflects the total number of majority opinions 
published in a given year citing a given material rather than the proportion of 
opinions authored by Republican and Democratic judges for each year that cite a 
given material.  Figures 2, 3, and 4 focus on the average probability scores of 
Republican and Democratic judges citing legislative history materials. 
Note that the absolute number of citations to different materials varies dra-
matically (e.g., there are many more citations to the United States Code than to 
floor debates or committee hearings).  We are not presenting these figures to 
highlight the differences in the number of citations to, say, the United States Code 
as compared to citations to floor statements or committee hearings. Instead, we 
are presenting them to highlight the relative changes within each type of material, 
and thus we use scales designed to highlight such changes. 
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Opinions Citing the Code of Federal Regulations (1965–2011) 
Opinions Citing the US Code (1965–2011) 
Citations to statements from floor debates or committee 
hearings are particularly striking, as they rose dramatically for 
Republican and Democratic judges through the mid-1980s and 
then equally dramatically decreased for Republican judges.  As 
for committee reports, in the mid-1980s Republican appellate 
judges began to cite them more often than Democratic appel-
late judges and the trend continues for the rest of the period in 
our study, with a significant increase by Republican judges in 
the early 2000s.  By contrast, there are no clear and prolonged 
patterns for citations to the U.S. Code and the C.F.R. 
One interesting aspect of these figures is that Republican 
judges’ increase in citations to committee reports was much 
greater than the increase in their citations to the U.S. Code: 
comparing 1965 to 1985 opinions with 1986 to 2011 opinions, 
the average number of Republicans’ majority opinions citing 
committee reports went from 121 per year to 681 per year (a 
462.8% increase), whereas the average number of Republicans’ 
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opinions citing the U.S. Code went from 1,399 per year to 3,292 
per year (a 135.3% increase).  This increase standing alone is 
not particularly significant, but it is suggestive of a notable 
increase in Republicans’ citations to committee reports, not-
withstanding Justice Scalia’s hostility to all forms of legislative 
history (and, indeed, his early singling out of committee reports 
for particular condemnation).92 
In order to assess the significance of the patterns observed 
in Figure 1, we employ a range of statistical tests.  These empir-
ical tests can evaluate the predicted relationship between 
Scalia’s attacks on legislative history materials and the deci-
sion to cite legislative history materials by appellate judges. 
A. Partisan Differences in Citation Behavior 
As we noted above, our first hypothesis is that after Justice 
Scalia’s attacks on legislative history materials there was a 
non-random difference between Democratic and Republican 
appellate judges’ citation of legislative history.  This raises the 
question of what years we should use for our comparison.  We 
chose as our main specification comparing majority opinions 
published between 1965 and 1985 with majority opinions pub-
lished between 1986 and 2011, on the theory that 1986 repre-
sents the most obvious break—it was the year that Scalia was 
confirmed to the Supreme Court, after some public discussion 
(including at his confirmation hearings) of his hostility to judi-
cial invocation of legislative history.  Thus 1986 was the most 
obvious year when circuit judges (and circuit judge nominees) 
would have become aware of the campaign against legislative 
history and in favor of textualism. 
We could have chosen other years as a breakpoint, and we 
could have dropped data in the first few years after he joined 
the Supreme Court, on the theory that it may have taken a few 
years for his attacks to achieve widespread understanding.  So 
we ran each empirical test presented in this Part with alterna-
tive specifications for different sets of years.  Specifically, our 
first set of alternative specifications utilized different cutpoints, 
comparing 1) opinions published from 1965 to 1987 against 
opinions published from 1988 to 2011; 2) opinions published 
from 1965 to 1989 against opinions published from 1990 to 
2011; and 3) opinions published from 1965 to 1991 against 
opinions published from 1992 to 2011.  Our second set of alter-
92 See supra note 20 and accompanying text; infra notes 111–112 and accom-
panying text. 
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native specifications omitted opinions that were published 
from 1986 to 1988, opinions published from 1986 to 1990, and 
opinions published from 1986 to 1992.  That is, these estima-
tions compared 1) opinions published from 1965 to 1985 
against opinions published from 1989 to 2011; 2) opinions 
published from 1965 to 1985 against opinions published from 
1991 to 2011; and 3) opinions published from 1965 to 1985 
against opinions published from 1993 to 2011.  Under each 
alternative specification, our primary results retain their statis-
tical significance and substantive meanings. 
Returning to our main specification, we first employ un-
paired t-tests on two subsets from our data.  The first subset 
contains opinions published from 1965 to 1985 (the pre-Scalia 
Effect time period), and the second contains opinions pub-
lished from 1986 to 2011 (the post-Scalia Effect time period). 
We perform an unpaired t-test for each type of legislative his-
tory material in our study to estimate whether there are statis-
tically significant differences in citation behavior towards 
legislative history materials between Democratic and Republi-
can judges.93  Table 2 presents the results of each t-test. 
93 In an alternative specification for the t-test results in Table 2, we calculated 
the difference in the number of opinions by Democratic judges that cite a given 
legislative history material and the number of opinions by Republican judges that 
cite the same material for each year.  We performed a set of unpaired t-test on 
whether the annual differences were significantly different from one another in 
the two time periods—pre- and post-Scalia’s ascension to the Supreme Court. 
This specification allows us to test whether the differences in citation behavior 
between Democratic and Republican judges were significantly different from one 
another in the pre-Scalia period against the post-Scalia period (they were).  The 
results of this process can be found in section A of the Appendix. 
If we had had reason to expect that there was an abrupt change in the citation 
behavior in one particular year within the range of our study, we would have 
performed a structural breaks test over the opinion data.  However, we have no 
reason to believe that there was a single relevant event.  As we discussed in the 
text, Scalia’s ascension to the Supreme Court is the best cutpoint, but his attacks 
likely came to be known, and to be influential, over a period of time.  Indeed, that 
is why we performed the alternate specifications with different years that we note 
in the text above. 
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TABLE 2: T-TEST RESULTS: COMPARING DEMOCRATIC AND 
REPUBLICAN JUDGES’ CITATION BEHAVIOR IN MAJORITY 
OPINIONS IN THE PRE-SCALIA EFFECT PERIOD 
(1965–1985) 
Floor Debates Committee 
or Committee  Reports
Hearings
T-Score 
(P-Value)
0.496 
(0.623)
0.954 
(0.345) 
# of Opinions 3,455 5,280 
% Authored by Rep. 46.97% 45.5% 
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.
COMPARING DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN JUDGES’ CITATION 
BEHAVIOR IN MAJORITY OPINIONS IN THE POST-SCALIA 
EFFECT PERIOD (1986–2011) 
Floor Debates Committee 
or Committee  
Hearings
Reports
T-Score 
(P-Value)
8.930***
(2.835e-11)
-2.349**
(0.023)
# of Opinions 4,348 24,935
% Authored by Rep. 28.8% 58.6%
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.
The tables reveal statistically significant divergences be-
tween Democratic and Republican judges’ citation practices 
between 1986 and 2011 but no statistically significant differ-
ence in the earlier time period.  Specifically, there are no statis-
tically significant differences between Democratic and 
Republican circuit judges’ majority opinions from 1965 to 1985 
in their citations to statements from floor debates or committee 
hearings or to committee reports, but there are significant dif-
ferences between Democratic and Republican circuit judges’ 
citation behavior in majority opinions from 1986 to 2011. 
Further, within the post-Scalia period t-tests, we observe a 
positive and statistically significant t-score for the t-test con-
cerning citations to floor debates or committee hearings and a 
negative and statistically significant t-score for the t-test for 
citations to committee.  The direction of the t-scores suggests 
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that, on average, in the post-Scalia time period Democratic 
judges cited floor debates or committee hearings more often, 
and committee reports less often, than their Republican 
counterparts. 
As a complement to the results in Table 2, we calculate the 
average probability that a Democratic and a Republican judge 
within our data would cite each type of legislative history mate-
rial in an opinion before and after the Scalia Effect.  The pur-
pose of this analysis is to take into account changes in the ratio 
of Democratic to Republican judges in the Courts of Appeals. 
We want to determine whether the citation behavior trends we 
observe in Figure 1 and Table 2 are driven by partisan differ-
ences rather than differences in the population sizes of Demo-
cratic and Republican appellate judges.  We first divide all 
opinions into pre-Scalia Effect (1965–1985) and post-Scalia Ef-
fect (1986–2011) categories, and then subdivide them into a 
Republican author group and a Democratic author group.  We 
calculate the probability of citing a given legislative history ma-
terial by dividing the number of published opinions citing a 
given legislative history material by the number of published 
opinions within each partisan group for each time period.94 
The resulting score ranges from zero to one, with higher scores 
implying that a judge is more likely to cite a given legislative 
history material.95  Given this calculation, the resulting esti-
mate can also be interpreted as the average probability that a 
Democratic judge or a Republican judge in our study would cite 
a given legislative history material.  Further, the estimated 
scores can also be referred to as propensity scores, as the esti-
mated scores depict and represent the mean observed citation 
behavior for each type of judge.  Figure 2 presents the average 
probability scores estimated in each calculation. 
94 This calculation assumes that, on average, a Democratic judge and a Re-
publican judge will author a similar number of published opinions each year. 
95 This calculation does not provide us with a measure of uncertainty for the 
point estimates, and for this reason there are no confidence intervals included in 
the figure. 
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FIGURE 2: AVERAGE PROBABILITY OF A GIVEN JUDGE CITING 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY MATERIALS IN A MAJORITY OPINION: 
PRE-SCALIA EFFECT AND POST-SCALIA EFFECT 
The visualizations in Figure 2 suggest that the average 
probability that a Republican judge would cite statements from 
floor debates or committee hearings decreased following 
Scalia’s attacks on legislative history.  By contrast, the average 
probability that a Democratic judge would cite such statements 
in her opinions was almost identical in both time periods.  Im-
portantly, the result suggests that the observed differences in 
citation of floor debates or committee hearings between Demo-
cratic and Republican judges are not simply driven by the ratio 
of Republican to Democratic judges. 
Further, Figure 2 suggests that in the pre-Scalia Effect 
time period the average Democratic judge and the average Re-
publican judge had very similar propensities to cite committee 
reports in majority opinions.  In the post-Scalia Effect time pe-
riod, the average probability for both types of judges of citing 
committee reports dramatically increased, with a larger in-
crease for Republican judges.  Overall, Figure 2 supports the 
estimated statistical differences in citation behavior between 
Democratic and Republican appellate judges found in Table 2 
and provides further evidence that the results in Table 2 are 
not simply driven by changes in the composition of the appel-
late bench. 
B. Presidential Cohort Effects on Citation Patterns 
Our second hypothesis predicts that judges nominated by 
a President who came before Reagan (pre-Reagan Cohort) 
would be more likely to cite legislative history materials than 
their counterparts appointed by Reagan and later Presidents 
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(post-Reagan Cohort).96  We estimate another set of unpaired t-
tests in order to test this hypothesis.  We perform an unpaired 
t-test for each type of legislative history material in our study to 
estimate whether there are statistically significant differences 
in citation of legislative history materials between judges from 
the pre-Reagan cohort compared to judges from the post-Rea-
gan cohort.97  Table 3 presents the results of each t-test.98 
96 We also tested this hypothesis with a set of pairwise t-tests comparing the 
number of opinions by each presidential cohort that cited legislative history 
materials.  We observed, for example, that Nixon judges’ citation of statements 
from floor debates or committee hearings is statistically distinct from the more 
recent Republican cohorts.  While the results provide evidence of statistically 
significant non-random differences in the citation behavior across older and 
newer presidential cohorts, the tests cannot tell us which cohorts will cite certain 
legislative history materials more or less often.  For this reason, we also calculated 
the average probability that a judge from each presidential cohort would cite floor 
debates or committee hearings along with the average probability that a judge 
from each cohort would cite committee reports.  The results of each pairwise t-test 
and the calculated average probability scores by cohort are in section B of the 
Appendix. 
97 In an alternative specification for the t-test results in Table 3, we employed 
a 1986 cutpoint as the start of the post-Reagan cohort instead of a cutpoint of 
1981.  The empirical and substantive results of Table 3 held under this alternative 
specification. 
98 There are two rather important considerations that we addressed in a 
robustness check of our results.  The first involves the D.C. Circuit, which hears a 
disproportionate percentage of cases involving statutory interpretation.  The sec-
ond is on the role of the Chevron doctrine, which changed the methodology a judge 
would apply to determine whether to accept an agency’s legal interpretation of the 
statute it administers.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837 (1984). 
As to the former, we replicated our primary results in Table 3 while omitting 
D.C. Circuit opinions.  The estimated coefficients for the Scalia Effect variable 
retained the same direction and level of statistical significance for each replication 
model.  This finding indicates that the citation behavior of D.C. Circuit judges is 
not driving our results in Table 3. 
To perform a robustness check with respect to Chevron, we ran a series of 
unpaired t-tests comparing Democratic judges’ and Republican judges’ citations 
in their majority opinions in the following categories: 1) all opinions from 2003 to 
2011; 2) opinions citing Chevron; 3) opinions citing but not applying Chevron; and 
4) opinions citing and applying Chevron.  Our general findings of observed differ-
ences between Democratic and Republican judges replicate for this specific time 
period (2003-2011).  Likewise, our statistical findings of meaningful differences in 
citations of floor debates or committee hearings by Republican and Democratic 
judges hold across each specification with respect to the Chevron doctrine.  With 
regard to committee reports, the statistically significant difference in citation be-
havior between Democratic and Republican judges goes away when we narrow 
our focus to opinions citing committee reports and citing the Chevron doctrine. 
Similarly, our statistically significant finding goes away when we narrow our focus 
to opinions citing committee reports and citing and applying the Chevron doc-
trine.  However, for opinions citing committee reports and Chevron but not apply-
ing the Chevron doctrine, the statistically significant difference between 
Democratic and Republican appellate judges reappears.  These results are in 
section C of the Appendix. 
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TABLE 3: T-TEST RESULTS: COMPARING PRE-AND POST-REAGAN 
JUDGES’ CITATION BEHAVIOR IN MAJORITY OPINIONS 
(1965–2011) 
Floor Debates Committee 
or Committee  Reports
Hearings
T-Score 
(P-Value)
-7.753***
(1.567e-12)
4.238***
(9.074e-05) 
# of Opinions 7,803 30,215
% Authored by 
Post-Reagan Cohort 
17.0% 51.3%
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.
Table 3 reveals statistically significant divergences between 
pre-Reagan and post-Reagan judges’ citation practices.  Specif-
ically, there are statistically significant differences between 
pre- and post-Reagan circuit judges’ majority opinions in their 
citations to statements from floor debates or committee hear-
ings and to committee reports. 
As with the t-tests in Table 2 for ideology, these results in 
Table 3 for presidential cohorts provide statistical evidence that 
Scalia’s attacks on legislative history and advocacy of textual-
ism are associated with differences among the cohorts’ citation 
of these legislative history materials. 
To extend our findings in Table 3, we calculate the average 
probability that a judge from each cohort would cite each type 
of legislative history material.  For each cohort, we calculate the 
probability of citing a given legislative history material by divid-
ing the number of opinions citing a given legislative history 
material by the number of published opinions.99  The resulting 
estimate ranges from zero to one, with higher scores suggesting 
a higher probability of a citation to a given legislative history 
material.  The resulting estimate indicates the probability that 
the average judge from within a cohort would cite a given legis-
lative history material in a given opinion.  As we noted above, 
these estimated scores are also referred to as propensity 
scores, as the estimated scores depict and represent the mean 
99 This calculation assumes that, on average, each pre-Reagan and post-
Reagan judge will author a similar number of published opinions each year, 
regardless of whether she is a Democrat or Republican.  This calculation does not 
yield a measure of uncertainty for the point estimates, and thus there are no 
confidence intervals included in the figure. 
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observed citation behavior for each cohort.  Figure 3 presents 
the estimated scores.100 
FIGURE 3: AVERAGE PROBABILITY OF A GIVEN JUDGE CITING 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY MATERIALS IN A MAJORITY OPINION: 
PRE-REAGAN COHORT AND POST-REAGAN 
COHORT 
The visualizations in Figure 3 suggest that the average 
probability of citing statements from floor debates or committee 
hearings is smaller for a judge in the post-Reagan cohort as 
compared to a judge in the pre-Reagan cohort, and the reverse 
is true for committee reports.  Thus Figure 3 indicates that the 
pre-Reagan cohort and the post-Reagan cohort exhibit different 
citation behaviors towards legislative history. 
In order to determine if there is an underlying partisan 
dimension within each cohort driving the average probability 
scores in Figure 3 and the results in Table 3, we disaggregate 
the pre- and post-Reagan cohorts based on the political party 
of the President appointing the judge.101  Figure 4 presents 
these estimated scores.102 
100 As we noted above, we chose to use Reagan as the dividing line on the 
theory that even pre-1986 Reagan judges had fewer opportunities to decide statu-
tory interpretation cases and thus might be more persuadable.  But in light of our 
use of 1986 as a cutpoint for the Scalia Effect in our first hypothesis, we checked 
the robustness of our scores by treating Reagan judges nominated in 1986 or 
earlier as a part of the pre-Reagan cohort.  The substantive probability scores 
changed very little. 
101 This calculation functionally operates the same as the previous estimation 
of average probability scores. See supra note 99. 
102 As with the previous analogous estimation, supra note 100, we checked the 
robustness of our scores by treating Reagan judges nominated in 1986 or earlier 
as a part of the pre-Reagan cohort.  The substantive average probability scores 
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FIGURE 4: AVERAGE PROBABILITY OF A GIVEN JUDGE CITING 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY MATERIALS IN A MAJORITY OPINION 
BY PARTISANSHIP AND COHORT 
Figure 4 suggests that post-Reagan Republican judges 
have a lower average probability of citing statements from floor 
debates or committee hearings than pre-Reagan Republican 
judges.  The same is true of pre- and post-Reagan Democratic 
judges.  This finding supports our prediction in our second 
hypothesis, as both Democratic and Republican judges in the 
post-Reagan cohort are less likely to cite statements from floor 
debates or committee hearings than their counterparts in the 
pre-Reagan cohort.  Notably, when we compare the estimated 
scores across the pre-Reagan and post-Reagan cohorts, the 
(slightly) larger difference in citations to statements from floor 
debates or committee hearings is among the Republican 
judges.103  The results with respect to committee reports are 
more dramatic.  Republican judges have a larger difference in 
their pre- and post-Reagan cohorts than do Democratic judges. 
changed very little.  This robustness check included a re-estimation of the scores 
found in Figure 4 under this alternative specification.  The results retained the 
same substantive meaning. 
We considered relying on a difference-in-differences estimation (DID), but we 
had concerns over violating the parallel trends assumption entailed in DID.  Post-
Reagan judges joined the bench in 1981 or thereafter, so a DID estimation com-
paring pre- and post-Reagan judges makes sense only for the post-1980 period, 
rather than the 1965 to 2011 period that our data covers.  That said, we per-
formed DID estimations for the 1981 to 2011 period.  The results conform to the 
estimations presented in Figure 4. 
103 When compared, Republican judges in the pre-Reagan cohort have a 0.036 
probability of citing floor debates or committee hearings, whereas Republican 
judges in the post-Reagan cohort have a 0.020 probability—a difference of 0.016. 
Democratic judges in the pre-Reagan cohort have a 0.061 probability of citing 
floor debates or committee hearings, whereas Democratic judges in the post-
Reagan cohort have a 0.047 probability—a difference of 0.015. 
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Interestingly, the propensity to cite committee reports is high-
est for the post-Reagan Republican cohort. 
The results thus far indicate that judges appointed before 
Reagan differ from judges appointed by Reagan or thereafter, 
and that this difference exists both for Republican and Demo-
cratic judges.  The differences between Republican and Demo-
cratic judges are not as striking as the commonalities among 
them: pre-Reagan Republican and Democratic judges are more 
likely to cite statements from floor debates or committee hear-
ings, and less likely to cite committee reports, than Republican 
and Democratic judges appointed by Reagan or thereafter.104 
Figure 1 displays the number of opinions citing legislative 
history materials before and after Scalia’s attacks.  In Figure 5 
we disaggregate those numbers by presidential cohort and par-
tisanship.  This allows a comparison of pre-Reagan Republi-
cans with pre-Reagan Democrats, and post-Reagan 
Republicans with post-Reagan Democrats.  These figures are 
not propensity scores, but instead display total numbers of 
opinions in each category.  Importantly, the pre-Reagan cohort 
is shrinking in the later time periods in Figure 5 due to deaths 
and retirements.  This helps explain why the total number of 
opinions authored by pre-Reagan judges citing legislative his-
tory materials (or anything else, for that matter) dwindles.  It 
also suggests that comparisons in Figure 5 between judges 
from different presidential cohorts may be less meaningful 
than comparisons within presidential cohorts. 
FIGURE 5: NUMBER OF MAJORITY OPINIONS CITING MATERIALS BY 
PARTISANSHIP AND COHORT (1965–2011) 
Opinions Citing Floor Debates or Committee Hearings by Pre-
Reagan Judges (1965–2011) 
104 We include data disaggregated for each appointing President in section B of 
the Appendix. 
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Opinions Citing Floor Debates or Committee Hearings by 
Post-Reagan Judges (1965–2011) 
Opinions Citing Committee Reports by Pre-Reagan Judges 
(1965–2011) 
Opinions Citing Committee Reports by Post-Reagan Judges 
(1965–2011) 
The visualizations in Figure 5 demonstrate that pre-Rea-
gan Democratic authors cite floor debates or committee hear-
ings more often than pre-Reagan Republican judges do.  And 
post-Reagan Democratic authors similarly cite floor debates or 
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committee hearings more than post-Reagan Republican judges 
do. 
Turning to committee reports, there is a relatively stable 
number of opinions authored by pre-Reagan Democratic and 
Republican judges citing such reports across the entire time 
period of interest.  By contrast, there was an explosion of opin-
ions citing committee reports for post-Reagan Democratic and 
Republican judges in the mid-2000s.  And the rise was particu-
larly striking for post-Reagan Republican judges.105 
105 When Figure 5 is replicated with the percentage, rather than the number, 
of all majority opinions that cite a particular type of legislative history, the same 
substantive patterns of citation behavior arise.  In Figure 5 we present the num-
ber instead of the percentage of opinions to maintain consistency with Figure 1. 
We performed four additional regressions over our data as additional specifi-
cations.  The first two regressions addressed our empirical results in Table 2 and 
the second addressed the results in Table 3.  The first regression is a logistic 
regression with the opinion as the unit of analysis and whether a specific type of 
legislative history is cited or not as the binary dependent variable.  The indepen-
dent variables are also binary and interact within the regression.  The first inde-
pendent variable is whether the authoring judge is Democratic or Republican, and 
the second is whether the opinion was written before or after the Scalia Effect. 
The second regression is a negative binomial.  The unit of analysis is at the year 
and circuit level.  The dependent variable of interest is a count of the number of 
opinions authored each year within each circuit that cite a specific legislative 
history material.  Once again, two binary variables that identify the partisanship 
of the authoring judge and the time period (pre- or post-Scalia effect) are included 
in the regression and interacted.  The third regression is a logistic regression with 
the same unit of analysis and dependent variable design as the previous logistic 
regression, with the exception that the interacted independent variable for the 
Scalia Effect is replaced by an independent variable for pre- versus post-Reagan 
judges.  That is, the first independent variable remains the same (whether the 
authoring judge is Democratic or Republican), and the only change is substituting 
the judicial cohort for the year Scalia joined the Court, in line with the difference 
in focus between Table 2 and Table 3.  The final regression is a negative binomial 
regression with the same unit of analysis and dependent variable design as the 
previous negative binomial regression, with the exception that the interacted in-
dependent variables concern the partisanship of the authoring judge and the pre-
versus post-Reagan cohort of the authoring judge (again, corresponding to the 
difference in focus between Table 2 and Table 3).  The results of each regression 
support the substantive and empirical findings presented in Figures 1, 2, 3, 4, 
and 5 and in Tables 2 and 3.  More broadly, the results of the first and second 
regressions provide statistically significant empirical support for our findings in 
this Article with respect to judges’ partisanship and citation behavior, and the 
results of the third and fourth regressions provide statistically significant empiri-
cal support for our findings in this Article with respect to judges’ cohort and 
citation behavior. 
If we had had reason to suspect irregular citation behaviors from year to year, 
we would have interacted the partisanship variable with the year the opinion was 
published.  Such a specification could mitigate bias introduced if irregular behav-
ior in one year confounded the interpretation of the partisanship variable.  For our 
data, however, Figure 1 and subsequent analyses indicate that there were rela-
tively steady and predictable changes from year to year within the range of our 
study. 
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With respect to the visualizations in Figures 4 and 5 and 
the empirical results in Table 3, it is important to highlight that 
when we control for the political party of the judges, the differ-
ences in citation behavior among pre- and post-Reagan cohorts 
are significant.  And when we control for pre- and post-Reagan 
cohorts, the differences in citation behavior between Demo-
cratic and Republican judges are also significant.  This leads us 
to conclude that the political party of a judge and the cohort 
have independent impacts on judges’ citation behavior. 
V 
IMPLICATIONS 
In the mid-1980s Antonin Scalia launched a campaign 
against judges invoking legislative history in statutory interpre-
tation.  He said that what mattered was the text that Congress 
voted on, and legislative history was irrelevant.  His attacks 
soon gained widespread notice and followers, helped by his 
prominence as a Justice and the sharpness and relentlessness 
of his attacks.  The resulting debate over the use of legislative 
history, and textualism versus purposivism more generally, 
was the central debate in statutory interpretation.  In this Arti-
cle, we have examined the effect of Scalia’s attacks, in light of 
the facts that, first, there was an ideological valence to judges’ 
public reactions to those attacks and, second, some judges had 
been deciding cases long before Scalia’s attacks began.  We 
hypothesized that Republican circuit judges would respond to 
the attacks more than Democratic circuit judges, and that cir-
cuit judges nominated by Reagan or later Presidents (post-Rea-
gan) would respond more than pre-Reagan judges. 
In an additional set of separate regressions, we also considered whether some 
judge-level characteristics of the authoring judge beyond political party and presi-
dential cohort correlate with citations to legislative history materials.  Relying on 
biographical data from the Federal Judiciary Center, we were able to identify for 
each judge the year she joined the appellate bench, her gender, and the law school 
she attended.  As to the latter, following Epstein, Landes, and Posner, we com-
pared Yale Law and Harvard Law graduates to the graduates of other law schools. 
LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES, & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL 
JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 355–56 (2013).  We 
found that, controlling for political party, the more recently a judge joined the 
bench the less likely she was to cite floor debates or committee hearings, and the 
more likely she was to cite committee reports.  As for education, judges from Yale 
and Harvard were slightly less likely to cite floor debates or committee hearings 
than were other judges.  The regression results also revealed no statistically sig-
nificant difference between citation to committee reports by graduates from Yale 
and Harvard and such citations by graduates of other law schools.  Further, we 
found no statistically significant correlation between gender and citation of any 
type of legislative history materials. 
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Specifically, we hypothesized that Republican and post-Reagan 
judges would be less likely to cite legislative history.  What we 
found is more nuanced: Republican judges and post-Reagan 
judges were less likely to cite statements from floor debates or 
committee hearings, but they were more likely to cite commit-
tee reports (including conference reports). 
So, how do we explain these results?  One seeming possi-
bility, which we did not hypothesize, involves control of Con-
gress and a particular application of judicial ideology.  As we 
noted above, between 1933 and 1980, Democrats controlled 
the Senate for all but four years, and between 1933 and 1994, 
the Democrats controlled the House for all but four years.106 
So through the 1970s, citing committee reports was likely to 
entail citing reports written under the auspices of Democratic 
leadership, whereas floor statements could come from any 
member of Congress.  A judge who wanted to invoke Republi-
can representatives’ views thus might switch from floor state-
ments to committee reports after Republicans started 
controlling committee reports. 
This possible reason for a switch to committee reports 
would not explain the behavior of Democratic judges: there is 
no reason to believe that post-Reagan Democratic judges 
wanted to cite committee reports more, and floor statements 
less, than their pre-Reagan Democratic counterparts because 
that way they would be citing Republican representatives.  As 
for Republican judges, note that this explanation entails af-
fected circuit judges being more ideologically conservative, or 
perhaps more short-term ideologically conservative, than 
Scalia.  After all, Scalia advocated against invocation of legisla-
tive history, and he started his campaign in 1985—the fifth 
year of Republican control of the Senate.  So judges who 
switched from citing floor statements to citing committee re-
ports in order to cite Republicans were either more ideological 
than Scalia or more focused on immediate implementation of 
ideology.  Scalia is usually considered to be on one end of the 
ideological spectrum, but this explanation entails many circuit 
judges who were nontrivially more ideological than he was, 
which is certainly conceivable, but there is no evidence that 
Republican judges were more ideologically conservative than 
Scalia was. 
The history of party control during our time period provides 
an opportunity to test this explanation.  After decades of Demo-
106 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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cratic control, Republicans controlled the Senate from 1981 to 
1987, but the House remained out of their reach until 1995.  If 
Republican judges’ move to citation of committee reports re-
flected their desire to cite Republicans in Congress, then we 
would expect a sharper increase in Republicans’ citations to 
Senate committee reports in the years during and immediately 
after Republican control of the Senate than in their citations to 
House committee reports.  Others have found that most cita-
tions to legislative materials occur within six years of legislative 
passage, so if Republican judges wanted to cite Republican 
Senators we should see a spike in citations to Senate and not 
House reports in the years 1981 to 1990.107  But in fact when 
we compare citations from 1975 to 1980 with citations from 
1981 to 1990, we find no statistically significant difference in 
the increase in the average probability score of a Republican 
judge citing a Senate committee report as compared to a House 
committee report.108  A second test focuses more specifically on 
post-Reagan Republican judges: if such judges were inclined to 
cite Republicans in Congress, we would expect a sharper in-
crease in their citations to House committee reports in the 
years after the Republicans gained control of the House in 1995 
than in their citation to Senate reports.  So we can compare 
post-Reagan Republicans’ citations to each house’s committee 
reports in the 1981 to 1994 period with their citations in the 
1995 to 2008 period.  We find no statistically significant differ-
ence in the increase in the average probability score of a post-
Reagan Republican judge citing a House committee report as 
compared to a Senate committee report.109  These findings, 
combined with the lack of evidence that Republican judges 
107 See John M. de Figueiredo & Edward H. Stiglitz, Signing Statements and 
Presidentializing Legislative History, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 841, 855–56 (2017). 
108 To allow for a time lag after the Republican takeover of the Senate in 1981, 
and as a robustness check, we also compared citations from 1975 to 1980 with 
citations from 1984 to 1990.  We found no statistically significant difference in the 
increase in the average probability score of a Republican judge citing a Senate 
committee report as compared to a House committee report. 
109 As another robustness check, we allowed for a time lag, this time after the 
Republican takeover of the House in 1995: we compared post-Reagan Republi-
cans’ citations to committee reports in the 1981 to 1994 period with their citations 
in the 1998 to 2008 period.  Again, we found no statistically significant difference 
in the increase in the average probability score of a post-Reagan Republican judge 
citing a House committee report as compared to a Senate committee report.  We 
performed similar robustness checks for all Republican judges (pre- and post-
Reagan)—one comparing committee report citations from 1981 to 1994 with those 
from 1995 to 2008, and another comparing such citations from 1981 to 1994 with 
those from 1998 to 2008.  As with the robustness checks for post-Reagan Repub-
lican judges, there were no statistically significant differences in either 
calculation. 
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were more ideologically conservative than Scalia, lead us to 
conclude that a desire to cite Republican Senators is not driv-
ing our results on Republican judges’ citation patterns.110 
We find a different explanation more persuasive, although 
we cannot prove it with our data.  We think that our results— 
which, recall, are only partially consistent with our original 
hypotheses—make sense in light of what happened both before 
and after Scalia launched his campaign.  For most of the twen-
tieth century, there was a broad consensus on the hierarchy of 
legislative history materials noted above.  Then, in the 1970s 
through the mid-1980s there was an explosion in citations to 
statements from floor debates and committee hearings, but no 
similar explosion in citations to committee reports.  The hierar-
chy of legislative history apparently had lost some of its force. 
Scalia and others’ attacks on legislative history seem to 
have destabilized, at least for some judges, the practices that 
were getting established in the 1970s and early 1980s.  And 
that destabilization seems to have had a greater impact on the 
judges that we hypothesize would be most likely to be 
influenced. 
But there were two competing sides in the debate in the 
mid-1980s and thereafter: textualists like Scalia who said that 
legislative history should generally be ignored, and 
purposivists who said that judges should start with the statu-
tory language but should be willing to look to reliable legislative 
110 Another alternative hypothesis involves lawyers’ supply of citations to cir-
cuit judges: perhaps at least one side in a case usually will have an incentive to 
cite legislative history, so that lawyers usually will present legislative history in 
their briefs; and insofar as judges’ opinions reflect what is in lawyers’ briefs, the 
judges’ opinions will thus cite legislative history.  Holding aside the degree to 
which opinions include all the arguments and citations in lawyers’ briefs, this 
hypothesis would not explain our results.  If we had found no differences in the 
Republicans’ and post-Reagan judges’ citations relative to their counterparts, 
then this hypothesis might be tenable.  But this hypothesis cannot explain the 
differences we find.  Similarly, if one posited that lawyers are more likely to cite a 
particular kind of legislative history in particular kinds of cases that might have 
increased or decreased over the period of our study (e.g., a category of case that 
might have risen in the post-Scalia period), that might conceivably explain a rise 
or fall in citations to a particular kind of legislative history among all judges.  But 
because panel selection of judges for a given case is blind to their political party, it 
would not explain the differences we find.  We suppose that one could attribute an 
extraordinary level of clairvoyance to lawyers in knowing that, for instance, Re-
publican judges would be relatively more likely to cite committee reports than 
their Democratic counterparts despite Scalia’s attacks (and even greater clairvoy-
ance in knowing not only who would be on their panel but also who on that panel 
would write the majority opinion), but that strains credulity, especially as no one 
before this Article has hypothesized (much less found) the divergence in the cita-
tion of committee reports versus floor statements or committee hearings that we 
find in this Article. 
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history if there were statutory ambiguities.  These purposivists 
usually invoked the hierarchy of legislative history materials 
that courts and commentators had regularly invoked through 
the 1960s, with committee reports at the top and statements 
from floor debates and committee hearings far below. 
One might have expected—and we hypothesized—that Re-
publican and post-Reagan judges would have tended to follow 
Scalia’s lead and cite legislative history much less than their 
Democratic and pre-Reagan counterparts (who would have 
tended to cite all forms of legislative history).  But in this Article 
we find that Republican and post-Reagan judges adopted prac-
tices more in line with ideological liberals like Judges Mikva 
and Wald who rejected Scalia’s blanket opposition than with 
Scalia himself.  The Republican and post-Reagan judges were 
less likely than their counterparts to engage in the practice, 
which had been common in the 1970s, of citing statements 
from floor debates or committee hearings; but they were more 
likely than their counterparts to cite committee reports.  In this 
way, these judges helped to revive the approach to legislative 
history that prevailed until the 1970s and was later champi-
oned by Scalia’s opponents.  The anti-legislative-history move-
ment led by Scalia seems to have shifted the debate, and the 
Republican and post-Reagan judges also shifted.  Their shift, 
however, was to the modified purposivism that responded to 
Scalia’s critiques and had prevailed until the 1970s, not to the 
broader rejection of legislative history that Scalia advocated. 
The fact that Republican and post-Reagan judges were 
more likely than their counterparts to cite committee reports is 
particularly ironic in light of Scalia’s earliest attacks on legisla-
tive history: as we noted above, in his first writings expressing 
doubt about legislative history, he stated that he was more 
skeptical of committee reports than of other forms of legislative 
history.111  As he said (after discussing other forms of legisla-
tive history) in a speech he gave at many law schools between 
the fall of 1985 and the spring of 1986, “At the bottom of the list 
I would place—what hitherto seems to have been placed at the 
top: the committee report.”112  Despite Scalia’s placement of 
committee reports at the bottom of the hierarchy of legislative 
history materials, Republican and post-Reagan judges became 
more likely than their counterparts to cite these reports, even 
as they were less likely to cite floor statements or committee 
hearings.  They appear to have accepted the hierarchy of legis-
111 See supra note 20. 
112 Farber & Frickey, supra note 20, at 442 n.64 (excerpting this speech). 
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lative materials that had previously prevailed—and that Scalia 
had rejected.113 
This Article thus has three significant implications.  First, 
influence on judges was heavily based on their political party 
and their pre-existing experience engaging in judicial statutory 
interpretation.  Republican judges were more influenced by the 
113 This does not necessarily mean that judges’ citation practices were sincere, 
in the sense that they were citing materials that they believed should be cited.  It 
is possible that their practices were insincere because they were strategically 
aimed at the Supreme Court, which might review any of their decisions: perhaps 
circuit judges cited materials based on what they thought the Supreme Court 
Justices wanted to see.  If so, judges’ citation practices reflect not persuasion but 
a desire to please the Supreme Court. 
There is no way to know whether such insincerity explains our results, but it 
seems quite unlikely.  Either all judges behaved strategically by citing materials 
insincerely (that is, to please the Supreme Court), in which case there is a puz-
zling divergence between what Republican and post-Reagan judges regarded as 
good strategy and what Democratic and pre-Reagan judges considered good strat-
egy, or only one set of judges (Republican and post-Reagan or Democratic and 
pre-Reagan) was engaged in such insincere strategic behavior.  The first possibil-
ity (with all judges citing materials in order to please the Supreme Court) might 
conceivably help to explain a consistent rise (or fall) in citations to legislative 
history (or even some types of legislative history) among all judges if the Supreme 
Court moved from one approach to legislative history to a different one.  But it 
cannot explain the divergence we observe unless one further supposes that these 
sets of judges systematically reached different conclusions regarding what strate-
gic citation behavior entailed.  This possible explanation seems particularly prob-
lematic for the divergence between Democratic and Republican judges, whose 
citation behavior did not significantly differ pre-Scalia but did significantly differ 
post-Scalia.  We would have to assume that they agreed on good citation strategy 
pre-Scalia but disagreed post-Scalia. 
The second possibility assumes that Republican and post-Reagan (or, con-
versely, Democratic and pre-Reagan) judges behaved significantly more insin-
cerely than their counterparts—and, in fact, Republican or Democratic (but not 
both) judges were not insincere pre-Scalia, but became insincere post-Scalia.  We 
have no basis for positing a divergence in judges’ taste for insincere citation 
behavior, much less for it arising only for either Democrats or Republicans post-
Scalia.  Beyond that, we also note that neither side of the divergence between 
Democrats and Republicans and between pre- and post-Reagan judges is obvi-
ously the strategic one, in terms of pleasing the Supreme Court.  Being more likely 
to cite committee reports but less likely to cite floor statements might appeal to 
some Justices in this period, but it might displease others (not only Scalia and 
presumably Thomas but also Justices who were happy to cite floor statements). 
And insofar as ideology might play a role, it seems strange that Republican 
judges, relative to their Democratic counterparts, adopted a citation practice that 
would be more associated with moderate Democrats than with conservative 
Republicans.  As we initially hypothesized in this Article, the more obvious result 
of ideology would be to push Republicans to cite all forms of legislative history less 
often than their Democratic counterparts. 
All that said, we cannot rule out the possibility that our results reflect judges 
citing materials simply to please the Supreme Court.  And if we could know the 
extent of that insincerity, it would shed additional light not only on the phenom-
ena we find but also on larger questions involving judicial behavior.  Ultimately, 
though, this possibility seems interesting but, in light of our data, highly 
improbable. 
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attacks on legislative history than were their Democratic coun-
terparts.  Independent of that ideological impact, judges who 
began serving during or after Scalia’s attacks were more influ-
enced than were their earlier-appointed counterparts.  And, re-
flecting the independence of these two effects, the combination 
of them was particularly powerful: the effect for Republican 
post-Reagan judges was greater than for Republicans alone or 
post-Reagan judges alone. 
Second, a single Justice was able to have a remarkable 
influence on judicial interpretation.  Most Justices are part of 
larger coalitions that, over many years, push judicial behavior 
in one direction or another.  But this was a campaign led by a 
single Justice, and it had a fairly quick and dramatic effect— 
and one that has persisted.  Other judges (and later Justice 
Thomas) joined Scalia’s crusade, though generally not with the 
same rejection of the invocation of legislative history.114  Scalia 
was the acknowledged leader, and, as our data show, the cru-
sade against legislative history had effects that were immediate 
and long-lasting, in addition to being significant.  There may 
have been other Justices who had a similar impact on some 
aspect of judicial behavior, but they have been few and far 
between.  John Marshall is the most obvious candidate, but it 
is not clear how many others there are.  As Justice Kagan noted 
in the quotation at the beginning of this article, Justice Scalia’s 
influence on statutory interpretation was exceptional.115 
But, third, the impact of Scalia’s campaign was mixed.  He 
put the issue on the table, spurring judges (and lawyers and 
law professors) to consider ignoring legislative history, and 
more generally to think about how and why they would treat 
legislative history.  That is an enormous impact.  But the re-
sponse to his attacks seems to have been that the most affected 
judges jettisoned floor and hearing statements, a form of legis-
lative history widely considered fairly unreliable, but embraced 
committee reports, a form of legislative history that had been 
considered reliable—by the lights of those who were willing to 
invoke legislative history.  Scalia’s campaign was able to stimu-
late a rethinking, but not an adoption of his approach.  That he 
was able to spur this rethinking is remarkable.  He did not, 
however, achieve his goal of eliminating virtually every invoca-
tion of legislative history. 
The bottom line from our data and analyses is that ideology 
matters, as does becoming a judge in the era before textualists 
114 See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text. 
115 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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started arguing against legislative history: the data show 
meaningful differences based on political party and pre- versus 
post-Reagan cohort.  But the nature of the impact was not 
what Scalia wanted.  The judges most influenced by his attacks 
seem to have (re)considered the role for legislative history and 
decided to adopt the pre-1970s consensus.  From his perspec-
tive, his impact was paradoxical, in the sense of being self-
contradictory: the judges his attacks most influenced accepted 
one element of his critique and rejected another element, even 
though he conceptualized those elements as part and parcel of 
a coherent textualist whole.  He wanted to convince judges to 
adopt textualism, but they did not.  He influenced, but he did 
not persuade. 
CONCLUSION 
We began this article with a quotation from Justice Kagan 
that Justice Scalia “taught everybody how to do statutory inter-
pretation differently” and that “we’re all textualists now.”116 
How do we assess those claims, and the success of Scalia’s 
campaign against legislative history? 
One way of looking at the data we present is that Scalia 
had meaningful success—he got half a loaf, and half a loaf is 
significant.  He attacked a practice he deemed unprincipled, 
and although circuit judges did not wholly accept his prescrip-
tion, Republican and post-Reagan circuit judges who might be 
expected to be more influenced by Scalia did become more 
careful than their counterparts in their invocation of legislative 
history.  He thus managed to destabilize the prevailing norms 
and push many judges to think more carefully about their use 
of legislative history. 
On a different view, many judges may have been influenced 
by Scalia’s critique of the prevailing approach to legislative his-
tory, but they rejected his categorical hostility to it.  Under 
Scalia’s approach, judges should treat legislative history as ba-
sically irrelevant.  Prominent liberal judges responded that leg-
islative purpose is relevant, and that there is a principled way 
of invoking legislative history that looks more to committee 
reports and less to floor debates and statements at committee 
hearings.  This debate led judges, and in particular Republican 
and post-Reagan judges, to consider these issues, and they 
sided with the prominent liberal judges: they concluded that 
Id. 116 
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text alone was not sufficient, and that committee reports 
should be invoked.  On this view, Scalia largely failed. 
Part of the choice between these positions depends on un-
knowable considerations.  For instance, what would have hap-
pened if there had been no attacks on the use of legislative 
history?  Perhaps liberal judges and law professors would have 
been happy for the 1970s pattern to persist, and so absent 
those attacks they would not have advocated for the pre-1970s 
consensus.  And maybe the legislative history practices of the 
1970s would have continued.  Under those circumstances, we 
would say that the Scalia-led attacks on legislative history were 
fairly successful, because they brought about the rethinking 
among liberal judges and law professors noted above, and 
spurred the movement away from the least reliable forms of 
legislative history.  On the other hand, perhaps even in the 
absence of any attacks on legislative history liberal judges and 
law professors would have made the same arguments for the 
pre-1970s consensus, and perhaps those arguments would 
have been exactly as successful as they turned out to be in 
reality.  In that scenario, Scalia’s arguments against legislative 
history achieved nothing, as the same result would have oc-
curred had Scalia never launched any attacks. 
These scenarios, as counterfactuals, are of course unprov-
able.  Beyond that, a conclusion about the degree to which 
Scalia succeeded or failed also depends on judgment calls with 
no obvious metric—notably, how much weight one puts on the 
influenced judges’ decrease in citations to floor debates or com-
mittee hearings versus their increase in citations to committee 
reports. 
Thus the best answer to the question whether Scalia 
achieved modest success or instead failed is yes. 
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Appendix: 
The Paradoxical Impact of Scalia’s Campaign 
Against Legislative History 
Stuart Minor Benjamin and Kristen M. Renberg 
A. 
ALTERNATIVE TEST OF DIFFERENCES IN CITATION BEHAVIOR 
BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN JUDGES 
As an alternative specification for the unpaired t-test re-
sults in Table 2, we first calculated the difference in the num-
ber of opinions published by Democratic judges citing a given 
legislative history material and the number of opinions pub-
lished by Republican judges citing the same material for each 
year.  We performed a set of unpaired t-tests on whether the 
annual differences were significantly different from one another 
in the two time periods: pre- and post-Justice Scalia’s ascen-
sion to the Supreme Court’s bench.  This specification allowed 
us to test whether the differences in citation behavior between 
Democratic and Republican judges were significantly different 
from one another in the pre-Scalia period against the post-
Scalia period.  The results are presented in Table A1 below. 
The results in Table A1 support the main findings in the 
Article.  With respect to citations to floor debates or committee 
hearings, the results indicate that Republican judges cited 
them 7.9% less often than Democratic judges in the pre-Scalia 
period.  The gap widened considerably after Scalia’s appoint-
ment, with Republican judges citing them 73.6% less often 
than Democratic judges.  With respect to committee reports, 
Republican judges cited them 16.3% less often than Demo-
cratic judges in the pre-Scalia period.  After Scalia’s appoint-
ment, not only did Republican judges cite committee reports 
more often than Democratic judges, but the gap was 122%. 
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TABLE A1: T-TEST RESULTS: COMPARING DIFFERENCES IN 
REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC JUDGES’ 
CITATION BEHAVIOR IN MAJORITY OPINIONS IN THE PRE- AND POST-
SCALIA PERIODS 
Floor  
Debates or 
Committee 
Hearings
Committee 
Reports
Pre-Scalia Effect R minus D 
(1965-1985) 
-7.93 
(21)
-16.33 
(21)
Post-Scalia Effect R minus D 
(1986 -2011) 
-73.66 
(26)
121.96
(26)
T-Score 
p-value 
14.33***
(1.155e-15) 
-5.572***
(5.32e-06)
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. Number of (years) are shown in parentheses. “R” 
represents Republican judges and “D” represents Democratic judges. 
B. 
PRESIDENTIAL COHORT RESULTS 
Figures B1 and B2 present the average probability scores 
for citations to legislative history materials for each presiden-
tial cohort in our study.  The results in Figure B1 indicate that 
more recent Republican cohorts have a lower probability of 
citing floor debates or committee hearings than do older Re-
publican cohorts.  Meanwhile, more recent Republican cohorts, 
on average, cite committee reports more often than older Re-
publican cohorts.  As for Democratic judges, there is an in-
crease in citations to committee reports with each succeeding 
presidency, whereas for floor debates or committee hearings 
there is an increase until the Clinton judges (the only post-
Reagan Democratic cohort).  It is also interesting to note the 
dramatically lower rate of citations to floor debates or commit-
tee hearings among post-Reagan Republican judges. 
We also performed a series of paired t-tests across Republi-
can cohorts and across Democratic cohorts to observe correla-
tions in citation behavior to legislative materials.  Each t-test 
compares one cohort of judges against another cohort of 
judges.  Tables B1 and B2 display the results for the paired t-
tests for Republican presidential cohorts.  Tables B3 and B4 
display the results for the paired t-tests for Democratic presi-
dential cohorts.  We highlight the statistically significant find-
ings in each table. 
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FIGURE B1: AVERAGE PROBABILITY OF CITING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
MATERIALS ACROSS REPUBLICAN COHORTS 
FIGURE B2: AVERAGE PROBABILITY OF CITING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
MATERIALS ACROSS DEMOCRATIC COHORTS 
TABLE B1: PAIRWISE T-TEST ON CITATIONS TO FLOOR DEBATES OR 
COMMITTEE HEARINGS ACROSS REPUBLICAN COHORTS (1965–2011) 
W. Bush H.W. Bush Reagan Ford 
H.W. Bush 1.000 - - -
Reagan 2.4e-07 2.7e-07 - -
Ford 1.000 1.000 6.8e-05 -
Nixon 3.8e-14 3.8e-14 0.09 5.0e-11 
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TABLE B2: PAIRWISE T-TEST ON CITATIONS TO THE COMMITTEE 
REPORTS ACROSS REPUBLICAN COHORTS (1965–2011) 
W. Bush H.W. Bush Reagan Ford 
H.W. Bush 1.000 - - -
Reagan 3.9e-09 2.2e-8 - -
Ford 1.000 1.000 2.4e-12 -
Nixon 0.62 1.000 4.9e-05 0.02 
TABLE B3: PAIRWISE T-TEST ON CITATIONS TO FLOOR DEBATES OR 
COMMITTEE HEARINGS ACROSS DEMOCRATIC COHORTS 
(1965–2011) 
Clinton Carter Johnson
Carter 1,8e-09 - -
Johnson 1.000 7.9e-08 -
Kennedy 0.93 7.2e-12 0.56 
TABLE B4: PAIRWISE T-TEST ON CITATIONS TO THE COMMITTEE 
REPORTS ACROSS DEMOCRATIC COHORTS (1965–2011) 
Clinton Carter Johnson
Carter  1.000 - -
Johnson 0.0003 0.0102 -
Kennedy 4.7e-05 0.0022 1.000 
C. 
CHEVRON 
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), 
creating a new two-step test to determine whether to accept an 
agency’s legal interpretation of the statute it administers. 
Given the importance of this new deference regime and the fact 
that the case was decided a couple of years before the rise of 
the attacks on legislative history, we test whether Chevron has 
a latent relationship with the decision to cite certain types of 
legislative history materials. 
Prior research by Barnett and Walker analyzed published 
appellate court opinions from 2003 to 2013 that cite Chev-
ron.117  The authors found that, in opinions citing Chevron, the 
court applied Chevron deference 77% of the time.  We merged 
117 Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2017). 
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our data with data provided by Barnett and Walker.  Table C1 
presents the distribution of opinions citing a given type of legis-
lative history material, citing Chevron, and applying Chevron. 
The results in Table C1 suggest the Chevron doctrine is usually 
applied when it is cited, but the percentage of cases applying 
Chevron varies. 
As an additional validation check for the main findings in 
our Article, we compared the opinions from the time period 
when our data overlaps with the Barnett and Walker study and 
found the same number of opinions citing Chevron.  We also 
replicated our finding of significant partisan differences in the 
citation behavior of judges for the specific time period of our 
data that overlaps with the Barnett and Walker study 
(2003–2011).  These results are shown in Table C2. 
Tables C3, C4, and C5 present the results of a series of 
unpaired t-tests.  The tests found in Table C3 include only 
opinions that cite Chevron.  The tests found in Table C4 include 
only opinions that cite but do not apply Chevron.  Finally, the 
tests found in Table C5 include only opinions that cite and 
apply Chevron. 
Across the five sets of results we found statistically signifi-
cant differences in citation behavior between Democratic and 
Republican judges in opinions citing floor debates or committee 
hearings.  With regard to committee reports, the statistically 
significant difference in citation behavior between Democratic 
and Republican judges goes away when we narrow our focus to 
opinions citing committee reports and citing Chevron (see Table 
C3).  Table C5 presents a similar finding, with no statistically 
significant differences between Democratic and Republican 
judges when we narrow our focus to opinions citing committee 
reports and both citing and applying the Chevron doctrine. 
However, when we consider opinions citing committee reports 
and Chevron but not applying the Chevron doctrine, the statis-
tically significant difference between Democratic and Republi-
can appellate judges reappears (see Table C4). 
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TABLE C1: APPLICATIONS OF Chevron in Reported Opinions by 
Courts of Appeals Across Types of Legislative Materials 
(2003–2011) 
Type of  
Legislative  
History  
Material
Number of 
Opinions* 
Number of 
Opinions
Citing  
Chevron+ 
Number of Opinions 
Citing and Applying 
Chevron ++ 
(% of Opinions Applying
Chevron and Citing 
Legislative Material)  
(% of Opinions Citing
and Applying Chevron) 
Floor Debates
or Committee 
Hearings
1,891 195 149 
(7.87%)
(76.41%)
Committee 
Hearing
212 26 21
(9.90%)
(80.76%)
Code of Federal 
Regulations
17,858 2,841 2,447 
(13.91%)
(86.13%)
U.S. Code 67,504 5,414 4,028
(5.96%)
(74.39%)
*Number of cases validated by Lexis Advance. 
+ Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Indicated by Barnett and Walker 
(2017) and Mayer Opinions. 
TABLE C2: T-TEST RESULTS: COMPARING DEMOCRATIC AND 
REPUBLICAN JUDGES’ CITATION BEHAVIOR IN MAJORITY OPINIONS 
(2003–2011) 
Floor  Committee 
Debates or Reports 
Committee 
Hearings
T-Score 
(P-Value) 
6.294***
(0.000)
 -2.949**
(0.012)
# of Opinions 1,891 10,478 
% Authored by Rep. 12.70% 56.89%
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. 
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TABLE C3: T-TEST RESULTS: COMPARING DEMOCRATIC AND 
REPUBLICAN JUDGES’ CITATION BEHAVIOR IN MAJORITY OPINIONS 
CITING CHEVRON (2003–2011) 
Floor  Committee 
Debates or Reports 
Committee 
Hearings
T-Score 
(P-Value) 
2.089**
(0.020)
-1.143 
(0.279)
# of Opinions 195 1,579
% Authored by Rep.  9.74% 61.45% 
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. 
TABLE C4: T-TEST RESULTS: COMPARING DEMOCRATIC AND 
REPUBLICAN JUDGES’ CITATION BEHAVIOR IN MAJORITY OPINIONS 
CITING BUT NOT APPLYING CHEVRON (2003–2011) 
Floor  Committee 
Debates or Reports 
Committee 
Hearings
T-Score 
(P-Value) 
4.894***
(0.000)
-2.223**
(0.044) 
# of Opinions 46 205
% Authored by Rep.  8.69% 65.36%
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. 
TABLE C5: T-TEST RESULTS: COMPARING DEMOCRATIC AND 
REPUBLICAN JUDGES’ CITATION BEHAVIOR IN MAJORITY OPINIONS 
CITING AND APPLYING CHEVRON (2003–2011) 
Floor  Committee 
Debates or Reports 
Committee 
Hearings
T-Score 
(P-Value) 
4.088***
(0.001)
 -0.922 
(0.377)
# of Opinions 149 1,374 
% Authored by Rep.  8.05% 59.75% 
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. 
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